Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

2017

The Impacts of Credit on Small Business Financing
in Florida
Ike Chukwuma
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please
contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University
College of Management and Technology

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

Ike Chukwuma

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.

Review Committee
Dr. Mohammad Sharifzadeh, Committee Chairperson, Management Faculty
Dr. Bharat Thakkar, Committee Member, Management Faculty
Dr. Javier Fadul, University Reviewer, Management Faculty

Chief Academic Officer
Eric Riedel, Ph.D.

Walden University
2017

Abstract
The Impacts of Credit on Small Business Financing in Florida
by
Ike R. Chukwuma

EDS, Nova Southeastern University, 2003
MSc, Alabama A & M University, 1990
BSc, Alabama A & M University, 1986

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Management
with Specialization in Finance

Walden University
November 2017

Abstract
In the United States, small businesses represent 99.7% of firms that provide employment
and account for over 50% of all private sector employment. Nevertheless, the rationing of
small business borrowing is an indicative of acute credit constraints emanating from
poverty, lack of collateral, lack of cosigners for bank loans, high administrative fees
associated with processing credit loans, and information asymmetry along with other
socioeconomic factors. In a 4-year study from 2004–2008, it was determined that small
businesses suffer tremendously from credit rationing. The purpose of this study was to
determine the induced effect of loan guarantee scheme, collateral, and leverage on credit
rationing. The seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss served as a framework for the study.
The research questions were developed to inquire the relationship (influence) of loan
guarantee scheme on credit rationing while controlling for collateral and leverage. Data
on small businesses were collected from the Small Business Administration and the
National Survey of Small Business Finances websites. Collected data (n = 1,072) of small
business firms in Florida for 2015 were analyzed through applying multiple regression
methodology. The study results indicated that small business participation in loan
guarantee scheme had a significant influence on credit rationing when the confounding
effects of collateral and leverage were statistically controlled. The findings of this
research could lead to positive social change by providing small businesses with loan
guarantee scheme, a government subsidy that eliminates the need for credit rationing.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
In the United States, small businesses have been the dominant force in job
creation and employment for the economy. The Small Business Administration (SBA)
reported that small firms, otherwise known as small businesses, represented 99.7% of all
employer firms and employed 50% of all private sector employment (Yallapragada &
Bhuiyan, 2011). Small businesses also provided employment for more than 45% of the
total U.S. private employment and generated 20–50% of net new jobs annually over the
last decade (Frid, Wyman, & Coffey, 2016). In a four-year study extending from 2004–
2008, it was indicated that small businesses suffered acutely from credit constraint (Mach
& Wolken, 2011). Among the various contributions of small businesses were the crafting
of new ideas in the existing markets, the making of critical decisions regarding business
locations, and the utilization of markets and institutional resources (Cole & Sokolyk,
2016; Singh & Singhal, 2015). Furthermore, the success of the combined role of small
and microenterprises (SMMEs) helped to stimulate economic growth and alleviate
poverty in the United States (Servon, Visser, & Fairlie, 2010).
However, the struggle of small businesses in obtaining the credits needed to
access loans interferes with their functions, growth, and survivability (Samujh, Twiname,
& Reuteman, 2012). Small business credits and loans are handled by banks and other
lending institutions; however, these financial institutions may have improperly gathered
information via secondhand financial data on their small business clients. There is a tense
relationship between firms and banks because of the opacity in information gathering,
which leads to credit rationing (CR) among small businesses. Microfinance institutions
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(MFIs) also suffer from loan approval as a result of improper information gathering
(Garmaise & Natividad, 2010).
Nevertheless, the studies on small business credit have become more widespread
in underscoring the small business credit struggle. Accordingly, the groundbreaking
theory of Stiglitz and Weiss (1985) on CR and the espousing theory of Kraus (2013)
made it known that CR costs more for high-risk loan applicants than for low-risk ones.
Both studies concluded that CR works well as a screening device that makes low-risk
applicants better off with an imposition of opportunity costs on low-risk applicants with
respect to obtaining loans. However, credible information gathering on small business
credit is difficult and proves to be an impediment in the struggle small businesses
encounter (Garmaise & Natividad, 2010).
The supply of loans by lenders involved costs which directly vary with the
volume of loan transactions. Figure 1 shows the graph of the interaction between the
demand and the supply of loans along with their varying interest rates in a financial
market system. The graph labeled various equilibrium points where the supply of loans
equals the demand for the loans and vice versa. In the graph, the vertical axis indicated
the various interest rates (r) offered to loan applicants, and the horizontal axis (Q)
indicated the volume of loans offered correspondingly for the loan applicants.
The marginal costs, or the interest rate for disbursing loans, exhibited an upward
sloping function. The marginal cost function described that as the volume of funds
supplied from lenders to borrowers’ increases, the cost spent on raw materials used in the
disbursement process increases in the direction of total output. No doubt, lenders need to
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protect their investments by charging an interest rate to cover the marginal cost of
disbursed loans. On the other hand, borrower’s utility reflects the economic benefits
obtained—an increase in production and consumption of goods and services.

Figure 1. Credit market equilibrium. Adapted from “Impact of Lending Relationships on
Transaction Costs Incurred by Financial Intermediaries: Case Study in Central Ohio,”
(Nalukenge, I. K., 2003).
Figure 1, on p.2 represents the interaction between demand and supply of loans in
a debt market equilibrium. In the graph, the vertical side indicated the various interest
rates (r) offered for each loan applicant, and the horizontal side (Q) indicated the volume
of loans offered for each corresponding interest rate, with the equilibrium at r =1.
Information asymmetry affects small business borrowing (SBB) with respect to
CR (Brown, Ongena, & Yesin, 2012). Improper information gathering in financial
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markets, especially in a credit market where there is a severe risk of loan default, greatly
affects small businesses (Brent & Addo, 2012). Asymmetrically distributed information
between agents and the theoretical beneficiaries of financial markets, or the principal
decision-makers’ reward function, could be interrupted (Canales & Nanda, 2012).
Nevertheless, the study should contribute to positive social change by creating awareness
on the importance of loan guarantee scheme (LGS) in SBB.
Background of SBB
Small business owners everywhere have their fair share of struggles in their
attempts to acquire adequate credit, and many beginning entrepreneurs were crippled in
their early formation because of poor credit (Mazure, 2011).
With soft information threatening SBB, Canales and Nanda (2012) posited to
“examine the interaction between bank size and market structure, focusing on banks’
ability to engage in relationship lending along with their ability to use soft information to
their advantage, made a difficult situation worse” (p. 354). Again, some of the soft
information on small businesses could be beneficial in helping to determine the small
business actual propensity to pay back loans. Information gathering in the 21st century
and the challenges of the various risk levels have altered the traditional ways of
processing loans between buyers and sellers of financial obligations with respect to credit
(Brent & Addo, 2012; Quijano, 2013). Information asymmetry between outsiders (the
investors), who provide capital, and insiders (the managers), who control the use of
funds, has led to the developments on the theory of how firms acquired and deployed
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capital for business expansion, and its effects on small business credit (Crawford,
Pavanini, & Schivardi, 2013).
Accordingly, the SBA (2006) guaranteed that lending to minority-owned small
businesses has a greater economic impact on market performance. Robb and Robinson
(2014) claimed that in a market with a higher per capita percentage, minority-owned
small businesses are more likely to experience problems stemming from information
asymmetry. SBA guaranteed loans could improve CR and lead to financial market
improvement. Nevertheless, an improvement in the local financial market positively
affects the economy at large.
The past 10–20 years have experienced an increase in bank loans, which is the
prime source of business finance for small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) with
respect to ex-ante assessments of banks. However, the riskiness of loan applicants and the
decision to grant (or not) SMEs loans at a risk-adjusted interest rate seem to take center
stage (Berger, Frame, & Ioannidou, 2011; Schwartz-Garliste, 2013). According to Robb
and Robinson (2014), firms have relied heavily on formal debt financing in the areas of
owner’s bank loans, business bank loans, and business credit lines. Nevertheless, loans to
households and SMEs, with sensitivity to systematic risk, are treated unfavorably and
required to pledge more collateral. This is supported by the findings of Jianchun and Daly
(2012), who stated that there are considerable differences between borrowers with respect
to their collateral requirements. Banks also could influence SBB via long-lasting
relationships (Gambini & Zazzaro, 2013; Rosenfeld, 2014).
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The study justified its importance on how small businesses suffer tremendously
from improper information gathering because of their inherent poor financial footings
before their lenders. They experience undue process fee charges and suffer immensely
from CR because they lack the necessary collateral to gain better credit approval. Small
businesses emanate from deprived backgrounds marginalized by poverty and with no
credit history. Because small businesses lack access to mainstream banks—and
consequently lack the proper financial access—and lack prior credit history for
commercial banks, small business loan approval is based on improper information
gathering. Though empirical evidence on the perception of entrepreneurs suggested that
access to finance may be harder for SMEs, factors such as controlling for SME
characteristics, firm growth, credit scores, and selection effects have downplayed that
small businesses are deprived in accessing finance (Lee & Drever, 2014).
Though SMEs experience credit problems when borrowing from commercial
banks, access to finance in deprived areas has its geographical consequences by creating
a financial gap in SBB (Appleyard, 2013; Mason & Pierrakis, 2013). Therefore, a finance
gap is likely to exist, and firms suffer as a result of geographic deprivation. Nevertheless,
only a limited number of studies considered access to finance in deprived areas a major
factor in SMEs borrowing (Lee & Crowling, 2013).
Presentation of the Study
The limiting factor of credit has been a major issue for SMEs. Small businesses
need the capital to finance their business undertakings. Because banks deem SMEs as
risky, they face the chances of loan denial (Department for Business, Innovation, and
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Skills, 2012; Lee & Drever, 2014). From the onset, the banking regulatory system has
placed emphasis on the firm’s proportion of its collateral when accessing loans. In
hindsight, a firm’s proportion of collateralized loans is positively related to its level of
credit risk and asymmetric information (Jianchun & Daly, 2012). Nevertheless, small
business owners have continued to loan default at such an increasing rate in the past 30
years that it becomes more difficult for SMEs to obtain loans from commercial banks.
It is equally important to further discuss the borrowing cost of loans to SMEs. The
ex-ante default risk of the borrowing firm should affect the firm’s borrowing cost because
of adverse selection, hence forcing financial institutions to ration credit rather than vary
their lending rates (Wu & Chua, 2012).
Problem Statement
The 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) explored the ways credit is
used in the United States, and the consequent effect of credit constraints faced by more
than 4,000 U.S. small businesses where small businesses experienced a downward spiral
in their credit acquisition (NFIB, 2010). In the four-year study from 2004–2008, the
problem of credit with small businesses grew to a point whereby their survivability was
threatened (Mach & Wolken, 2011). Small business owners suffer a common problem
arising from insufficient credit, resulting in higher interest rate payment. Furthermore,
many small businesses have no form of credit history, which affects their access to loans
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2013; Gupta, Wilson, Gregoriou, & Healy, 2014).
Access to credit has been a strategy used not only in the United States but in many
countries of the world. Developing countries used credit access as an instrument to
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reduce poverty and encourage debt financing in small business setups (Al-Azzam,
Mimourn, & Ali, 2012; Brown et al., 2012; Yallapragada & Bhuiyan, 2011). Information
asymmetry in a marketplace occurs when the demand for loans exceeds its supply, or
vice versa, undoubtedly leading to credit market disequilibrium and giving rise to credit
rationing. Also, the absence of collateral to lessen the burden of loan heightens the
creation of lending crises (Cassano, Joeveer, & Svejnar, 2013; Steijvers & Voordeckers,
2009).
Though many scholars have documented the struggle of small businesses with
regards to credit, none have discussed LGS as an alternative to CR. LGS is a government
program created as a buffer to the credit market imperfection by addressing the financing
needs of SMEs through debt capital (Kuo et al., 2011). The fact that most small business
owners lack collateral makes it difficult for small businesses to mitigate credit problems
(Blazy & Weill, 2013).
Purpose of the Study
The quantitative design method of the study statistically explored if loan
guarantee scheme (LGS), collateral (COLL), and leverage (LEV) could alleviated the
burden associated with credit rationing (CR) in small business debt financing. The
research design used a survey method, along with a survey instrument sent to 200
randomly selected small business owners in the state of Florida for data collection.
The dependent variable, CR, was measured by the amount of loan(s) received by
the small business divided by the total credit requested from the bank. The independent
variables of the study involve the different components of small business LGS, along
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with COLL and LEV. The potential findings of the study were explored using the SBA
data set to expand LGS programs, reduce poverty, advance marginalized small business
owners, and help to advance positive social change.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
For the study, the following three research questions and hypotheses were
investigated:
Research Question 1
RQ1: Is there any relationship (influence) of LGS on CR?
Null Hypothesis 1
H01: There is no relationship (influence) of LGS on CR.
Alternative Hypothesis 1
H1: There is a relationship (influence) of LGS on CR.
Research Question 2
RQ2: Is there any relationship (influence) of COLL on CR?
Null Hypothesis 2
H02: There is no relationship (influence) of COLL on CR.
Alternative Hypothesis 2
H2: There is a relationship (influence) of COLL on CR.
Research Question 3
RQ3: Is there any relationship (influence) of LEV on CR?
Null Hypothesis 3
H03: There is no relationship (influence) of LEV on CR.
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Alternative Hypothesis 3
H3: There is a relationship (influence) of LEV on CR.
Summary of Criteria for Hypotheses and Equations
Equations 1–6 took the form of partial derivatives. The relationship between the
dependent variable (the numerator) and the independent variable (the denominator) was
zero for Equations 1, 3, and 5 and greater than zero for Equations 2, 4, and 6.
Hypothesis 1
H01 is rejected if the following pattern of partial derivative between CR and LGS
holds:

∂CR
∂LGS

=0

(1)

Further, H1 is accepted if the following pattern of partial derivatives between CR
and LGS holds:

∂CR
∂LGS

>0

(2)

Hypothesis 2
H02 is rejected if the following pattern of partial derivative exists between CR and
COLL:

∂CR
∂COLL

=0

(3)

Similarly, H2 is accepted if the following pattern of partial derivative is found
between CR and COLL:
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∂CR
∂COLL

>0

(4)

Hypothesis 3
H03 is rejected if the following pattern of partial derivative exists between CR and
LEV:

∂CR
∂LEV

=0

(5)

In the same manner, H3 is accepted if the following pattern of partial derivative is
found between CR and LEV:

∂CR
∂LEV

>0

(6)

Equation 7 presents how the statistical tests were performed on the variables of
the study including the error term and sample estimates:

CR = β0 + β1 LGS + β2 COLL + β3 LEV + ε

(7)

Discussions of the criteria for retaining or rejecting of either the null or alternative
hypotheses for the study are met in Chapter 3.
Theoretical Foundation
My study in SBB reflects a model presented by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and
Becchetti, Garcia, and Trovato (2011) involving demand and supply loans in a debt
market. In the study, Stiglitz and Weiss postulated that market failure to adjust to price
changes when demand exceeds supply, or vice versa, causes disequilibrium in the market,
and hence CR. Furthermore, Stiglitz and Weiss argued that the reason for loan rationing
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is prices could not be adjusted for equilibrium between demand and supply. In addition, a
loan market may be characterized by CR because the interest rate banks assess to
borrowers and the riskiness of the loan obligations are unfairly targeted to small
businesses, and hence disequilibrium in the price of loans.
The model presented by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) reflected the credit experience
small businesses undergo in the United States when they try to obtain loans (Dou et al.,
2014; Robb & Robinson, 2014). Nevertheless, the interest rate banks charge small
businesses in loan pricing is important. The interest rate payment charged by banks is
used to sort out certain kinds of borrowers because only risky borrowers are willing to
invest at such a high rate of interest, leading to adverse selection and moral hazard
problems (Cassar, Ittner, & Cavalluzzo, 2015). As the interest rate rises, the riskiness to
the borrower increases, signaling lower profits for banks. A change in interest rate and
other contractual apparatus affects the borrower’s likelihood for loans (Stiglitz & Weiss,
1981).
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) stated that in a loan market, banks make loans and
acquire profits based on the loan riskiness and the interest rate such loans attract. The
interest rate that a bank charges on the loan may affect the riskiness of the loans, and the
interest rate is instrumental in deciding potential borrowers of such loans. In an era of
imperfect information gathering, banks may increase their profit margin by charging
interest rate accordingly. The existence of information asymmetry has brought about
changes in interest rates and other contractual arrangements, leading to disequilibrium
between supply and demand in the financial market.
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Jianchun and Daly (2012) cited that providing collateral as a tool in a market,
characterized by informational asymmetries, is a sign of risky lending, which may solve
CR. Furthermore, the study indicated that a firm’s proportion of collateral is positively
related to its level of risk and asymmetric information. However, there was a lack of
competition among small business to increase the interest rate to bring together demand
and supply. In a similar model of CR, Berger et al. (2010) articulated that a contractual
use of collateral is good for lenders, borrowers, and the society at large. Though lenders
incurred costs from screening and monitoring the pledged assets, borrowers, on the other
hand, suffered as collateral may impose a form of opportunity costs to them by tying up
assets that the borrowers could have otherwise used for further productive processes.
The credit market is unlike the standard market because it deals with the
allocation of credit. Credit is defined as the value of money or goods received by an
individual or firm in exchange for a promise of repayment in money or goods in the
future. The analysis of credit allocation could be complicated when viewed from a
standard market perspective. A market for credit is the same as a promise. The interest
rate is the underlying factor that differentiates the standard market from the credit
market—the interest rate is the price that equates the demand and supply for credit. Poor
allocation of credit implies poor investment project, and the firms and the nation end up
paying the price. However, the nature of credit markets was most evident in the case of
CR where borrowers of financial obligations are denied credit, even though they are
willing to pay the market interest rate (Berger et al., 2010; Blazy & Weill, 2013).
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Nature of the Study
This study was guided by a quantitative design and used a survey method to
collect data for the study. The sample of 93 small business owners was selected randomly
from among small businesses in Florida. The dependent variable was CR—measured by
the amount of loan received by the small business divided by the total credit requested
from the bank. The independent variables are made up of small business LGS, leverage,
and collateral. The data collection consisted of sampling 93 small business owners in a
ratio of 62 small businessmen to 31 small businesswomen, respectively. Data analysis
determined if a correlation existed between LGS and CR. In addition to using the Pearson
correlation coefficient, the study’s data analysis followed a model used by Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) and data from the SBA conducted by the NSSBF of 1998. In addition,
archival data from SBA was implemented to determine the significance of the study.
Given the research question and the hypotheses testing, the analysis ascertained if a
correlation existed between LGS (independent variable), CR (outcome/dependent
variable), and COLL (confounding variable).
Furthermore, using the Pearson correlation coefficient along with the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) achieved statistical significance of success or
failure. Though collateral had a mitigating effect on CR, its research-lessening intensity
needed controlling to realize the positive impact of LGS. Statistics from the studies of
Levenson and Willard (2013) and Regis and Weill (2013) could be used to verify the
impact of LGS as an alternative to CR. Additional statistics involved the logit model
regression to reach the desired result.
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Assumptions
The initial assumption for the study was that an average small business owner is
credit constrained because of poverty that threatens their existence. Small business
owners obtained the initial startup capital from their friends and families rather than from
commercial banks. Furthermore, SMEs are concerned with loan denial especially when
they are financing fixed investments (Akin, 2014; Mueller & Reize, 2013). Besides, the
wave in economic and political development in most parts of the world and in SMEs
increased the importance of the change.
SMEs lack access to public equity market and corporate bond market, hence their
chances to external financing is difficult (Mueller & Reize, 2013). At this conjecture,
little is known if SMEs, by adjusting their investment volume, can meet the rising
demand for loans.
Furthermore, the study discusses assumptions by evaluating the role participants
play in research from their answers to questionnaires. The special role the participants
played in providing answers to questionnaires is confidential in nature and requires some
degree of trust. As well, the characteristics of participants and the information they
provided required some form of evaluation (Patton, 2002). However, the outcome of the
study could be affected by the character of a participant, which is difficult to determine.
Scope of the Study
This study is a testament to the struggle SMEs undergo in their attempt to obtain
credit for the success of their business. Many times, small business owners are denied
loans because of inadequate credit, no collateral, and improper information gathering by
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commercial banks. Capital structure informs that a firm’s first year of operation is
difficult for startups and ends up in funding from friends and family. Many startups
receive debt finance through a personal balance sheet of the entrepreneur and levered
equity claims in their startups (Robb & Robinson, 2012).
The SBA has remained an important source of credit for small business,
especially in the wake of economic unrest, at which point the SBA addresses the financial
fragility of the U.S. enterprise system and provides needed financial assistance. The SBA
is no doubt a medium used by the U.S. government to mitigate the financial and
institutional challenges faced by small businesses (Cortes & McKinnis, 2012).
The gap in the study is one of the most important parts of the study: reflecting the
role LGS played in CR. Nevertheless, commercial banks used the outcome of CR as a
yardstick to determine the nature of credit constraint on small businesses and to guard
against the losses arising from information asymmetry (Ata, Korpi, Ugulu, & Sahin,
2015). The loan guarantee (otherwise, collateralized loan) was used to ease access to
finance for small business and recognize their pivotal contributions to the community and
the economy. Before this time, financial institutions reserved their limitation to grant
credit to SMEs on the grounds of the high administrative cost of processing small
business loans, inherent asymmetric information associated with small businesses, their
high-risk perception nature, and lack of collateral (Kuo, Chen, & Sung, 2011).
Delimitations of the Study
The participants in the study were small business owners in Florida who have
experienced credit constraints and whose credit experiences have denied them the chance
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to obtain loans. There are no shortcuts to bypass credit constraints but the use of
collateral, or the relationship lending with commercial banks, had a mitigating effect that
leads to CR. With the issues of credit constraints growing over time in the study, a gap in
the literature was explored that led to LGS. LGS is a collateral-free government program
for financing small business loans (Kuo, Chen, & Sung, 2011). The gap in the study was
another factor that narrowed the research, as small businesses deal with the issue of lack
of adequate capital. As indicated, few studies have identified LGS as a substitute to the
CR of small businesses. Access to finance was a key factor in small business existence
and a strong influence in entrepreneurial survivability (Klapper & Parker, 2011). Since
access to finance is difficult to achieve in small businesses, the concept of finance
required the evaluation and the functioning of the credit system. Because of lack of
credit, commercial banks resorted to CR, which is a constraint in SBB. Credit guarantee
scheme (CGS), an outcome of LGS, is the most popularly accepted tool (Gurmessa &
Ndinda, 2014; Tunahan & Dizkirici, 2012). With the program in place, small businesses
could now qualify for government subsidy. Qualification is based on the ability or proof
for providing employment for the people, and social amenities for the society.
On the other front was the issue of delimitation as it relates to small business
population size and the geographic selection of participants. The research design
streamlined the study of SBB. The factors that narrowed the study of SBB started in the
data collection phase.
The pool of participants came from small businesses residing in South, Central,
and North Florida. The study focused its data collection and questionnaire gathering on
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Florida small business owners, most of whom are marginalized in their income because
of poor credit. The population sample for the study was 300. The larger the population
sample, the closer it was to a meaningful statistic solution. The ratio of the sample was
200 small businessmen to 100 small businesswomen.
Limitations
It was evident in some cases that the data collection phase could involve some
element that could be biased because of the trust aspect of data collection in question. In
small business data gathering, the data collection process needed to determine a
government subsidy is based on the small business owners’ ability to provide
employment for the people and social services for the community. Even so, most small
business employment is unstable because they lack scrutiny and involve unskilled
individuals who get hired and fired at will.
Honesty on the parts of the participants when collecting data for the study was
important for the success of the study. Bauguess or falsified answers when completing
the questionnaires could hinder the result of the study. Participants should be encouraged
to provide answers that are error-free to guide the study.
Time is an interval that needs to be considered in a research setting. In this study,
I projected the time to complete my research without creating room for revisions that
might occur during the study. Incidentally, the prospectus to my research, which I
thought was completed, came back incomplete. This indeed created a setback in the
study. It took me two quarters, excluding the initial quarter that I started the prospectus,
to have the prospectus approved.
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Nevertheless, limitations curb the extensity to which a study can go (Simon &
Goes, 2013). Since access to finance lacks in small businesses, the concept of finance
requires the evaluation and the functioning of the credit system. Because of lack of credit,
commercial banks resorted to CR, which is a constraint in SBB. CGS, an outcome of
LGS, is the most popularly accepted tool (Gurmessa & Ndinda, 2014; Tunahan &
Dizkirici, 2012).
Significance of the Study
This study of small business credit revealed the under-researched area of loan
guarantee scheme (LGS), as well as the issues of credit that undermine the struggle of
small businesses. The study addressed the inability of small businesses to obtain loans,
serving as a major deterrent in small business survival. Small businesses lacked the
necessary collateral in their financing history, and hence impacted their credit mitigation
efforts (Berger, Frame, & Loannidou, 2011; Menkhoff, Neuberger, & Rungruxsirivorn,
2011). Small businesses, especially those in the United States, have an option to finance
debt through LGS. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Office of Advocacy
addresses the financial needs of small businesses through the auspices of the basic
guaranteed loan program. The emergence of LGS as the next best thing to credit rationing
signals that small businesses can access debt capital, based on the social and economic
opportunity they create as entrepreneurs (Kuo et al., 2011). The benefits created by small
businesses through LGS are seen in the employment and social opportunities they create
and in the export revenues they generate. The self-financing advantage of LGS through
the guarantee fees (premiums) helps to avoid the default risk applicable to debt financing.
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The study reaches people that have not been reached before. The gap in the
literature is clearly stated as it relates to the professional and scholarly components of the
study, and the impact understood as it relates to the extensive nature of the problem
statement informed by an in-depth literature review.
Besides the knowledge gained in writing the research, its national and global
effect on small businesses and its worthwhile enrichment in my profession has made this
study an exceptional one. The significance of the study not only fills the literature gap but
further informs those in the professional and the academic sectors of the world.
Filling the Gap in the Study
The study filled the gap in the literature by identifying LGS as a debt financing
option for small businesses. The gap nevertheless pointed to LGS as the effective
alternative to CR in small businesses borrowing. The guarantee fee (the interest rate
premium) is set-loan according to the amount of collateral the borrower placed on the
loans, causing the difference between the lending rate for nonguaranteed loans and
guaranteed loans (Kuo, Chen, & Sung, 2011). LGS is credited for implicit indirect
subsidization and evaluated regarding the economic and social benefits that LGS
creates—generation of export revenue and creation of employment opportunity (Kuo et
al., 2011).
Initially, the only way for small businesses to access capital was through credit
rationing offered by commercial banks. LGS is a packaged government program that
involves implicit indirect subsidization, evaluated in terms of the economic and social
benefits created by the small businesses in the community they serve. With LGS, small
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businesses are now qualified for government subsidies and granted access to debt capital.
With LGS, credit constraints have no place in SMEs, and debt financing is no longer a
problem. Those qualified for LGS simply submit evidence by providing employment and
social services in their employment or in the community which they operate (Kuo, Chen,
& Sung, 2012). Although many government programs lacked a clear tone on what the
objectives are or a clear-cut definition on how to evaluate the program, LGS has the
initial aim of self-financing.
Benefit of the Study to Practitioners
The study added to the scholarly literature of small business financing. Scholars
and practitioners alike are informed on a new wave of thinking for small business
financing. LGS as a collateral-free financing can replace CR, and access to financing can
be limitless for small businesses. In the academic sector, universities can use the outcome
of this study for knowledge dissemination by discussing the study and its concept that
LGS helps to ease the SMEs financial burden to better the economy at large.
Contribution of the Study to Positive Social Change
The study has the potential to affect positive social change by improving the
capital structure on SBB. Access to finance, which was once a barrier in SBB, has now
become a practice of a bygone era (Sleutjes, Van Oort, & Schutjens, 2012). Moreover,
the CR from commercial banks could become a thing of the past with the increase in
awards from government subsidies; small business growth hence becomes boundless. In
an economy, employment opportunity grows as well as the social amenities for people,
which becomes an outcome of the benefit of this study.
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Summary and Transition
The existence of small business has been marred by a myriad of credit problems
stemming from poverty, lack of capital, no collateral to mitigate credit problems, and not
having the basic accounting records necessary to obtain loans. Poor information gathering
and an improper process of information also tend to magnify the issue of credit for small
business. Even with many federal and state governmental programs available to lessen
the problem of poor credit for small businesses, not much has changed in that direction.
The minor purpose of the study was to determine whether CR, as assessed by banks, had
a greater effect in deciding the amount of loan(s) a small business is approved for.
The major purpose of the study was to determine if LGS provided a better
alternative to small business credit rationing when dealing with debt financing. Though
improper information gathering persists, the outcome of this study could be used to help
improve the credit problem that threatens the existence of small businesses. An overview
of the literature pointed out a gap regarding LGS not covered by any known study, and
few studies have streamlined the essential importance of LGS in SMEs borrowing.
Hence, the purpose of this study was to determine if LGS provided an alternative
to long-existing CR in the process of debt financing. Chapter 1 presented the
introduction, the overview of study, the nature of study, the problem statement, the
purpose statement, the research questions and hypothesis, criteria for the hypotheses, the
theoretical framing, the methodology, the significance of the study, the variables for the
study, the assumptions for small business credit, and the limitations in small business
credit. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on small businesses credit lending. Chapter 3
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presents the methodology and statistical analyses guiding the study. Chapter 4 describes
the study’s results and assumptions. Chapter 5 discusses the findings, recommendations,
and conclusions of the study.

24
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This literature review discusses credit constraint along with other mitigating
factors that limit SBB. Bank credit has been a source of external finance for SMEs and a
limiting force in the presence of information asymmetry (Canales & Nanda, 2012;
Garmaise & Natividad, 2010). Many small banks cater to small firms using hard
information technology, fixed assets lending, and credit scoring to approve bank credit to
startups, and to relax geographic expansion through the Interstate and Banking Efficiency
Act (McNulty, Murdock, & Richie, 2013; Rice & Strahan, 2010). Credit constraints and
improper information gathering have proven to deter the chances of financial opportunity
for SMEs and startups.
Poverty remains a global problem and a stumbling block for small businesses’
access to finance. The incentive of growth and developing entrepreneurial activities by
SMEs are often interrupted as a result of poverty. Small business has been met with a
myriad of difficulties and has lost out in different stages of development. Interference by
the government has helped stimulate SMEs in the right direction (Kent & Dacin, 2013;
Tahir, Mohamad, & Basheer, 2011). Poorer, nascent entrepreneurs are more prone to
abandon their business before its formation into a firm status because of liquidity
constraint and lack of planning (Mukwasi & Seymour, 2012). In the absence of enterprise
resource planning, poverty in small business formation is a recipe for failure, and
therefore many small business owners failed because of liquidity constraints.
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Information opacity that small businesses suffer from as a result of credit
constraint and improper information gathering could be minimized by pledging a
collateral-free guarantee through third-party relationship lending. Loan guarantees by the
government are an important tool to reduce collateral requirements (Jianchun & Daly,
2012). Though collateral has been accepted in contractual arrangements for its debtreducing feature, its use is often costly on borrowers. Becchetti and Garcia (2011) spoke
of the positive incentive of collateral in “that these incentives contribute to solving
problems of hidden action and to reducing the lenders’ monitoring costs” (p. 932).
Collateral is a remedy usage for CR, but its use is inherently limited because of the cost
involved in its usage. Therefore, guarantees are the way to go when one needs to reduce
collateral requirements.
Firms obtain the needed capital to expand on new business ventures through
private market infusion as well as the injection of government capital under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP). The importance of raising capital is felt more seriously in
the wake of financial crises (Elyasiani, Mester, & Pagano, 2014). The issue of raising
new equity or capital through a private market or TARP has investors reacting positively,
since a firm’s equity value increases because of a sufficient selection of banks
participating in TARP. Overall, the decision for market capital injections might differ
between the different times of stress from financial crises and ordinary times. Similarly,
reaction might vary between periods of recession versus time of expansion. Nevertheless,
the reaction of investors to a firm’s decision of injecting large amounts of equity capital
to the financial stream of small business is sensitive to firm characteristics.
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Literature Search Strategy
Literature searches were limited to a five-year threshold (2011–2016). The only
exception was for the seminal works from key historical theorists whose publications are
beyond five years old, and the overly importance of their literature made it necessary for
their use. All the relevant literature necessary to explore SBB was gathered. The literature
gathering process was important because past decades have chronicled a serious decline
in small business credits. Walden University’s home library was used to search for
articles from 2010–2016 related to my research topic in the business management
section. EBSCOhost and Academic Search Premier Databases were used, along with
Boolean operators for key terminologies. Articles on the exact topics were also searched
using digital object identifiers (DOI).
In the three years of literature search, I came across the seminal works of Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) and Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009), whose conceptual findings are
the pivotal pillar on which small business credit and credit rationing concepts are defined
upon. Furthermore, the current peer-reviewed literature gave more information on the
credit history of small businesses and when it becomes essential in borrowing from
commercial banks.
The evolution of small business credit and the practice of borrowing originated
from financial economists. Seventy years have passed since Wendt (1947), who
examined the issue of availability of credit for small business to see the possibility of
making loans available for SBB. The fierce competition between large banks that limit
and lower funding costs affects the ability of small banks to attract and maintain their
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borrowers. Nevertheless, the issue of a government bailout to protect creditors from
large, insolvent banks is seen as a move in the right direction (DeYoung, Kowalik, &
Reidhill, 2013). Likewise, the contribution of small banks’ lending to startups resulted in
a lower failure rate, as their lending targeted small, opaque firms stricken by a “poverty
trap” (Kraay & McKenzie, 2014). In comparison to small banks, large banks may have a
comparative disadvantage in relationship lending with their customers.
On a historical front, conventional wisdom suggests that small businesses are
innovative engines of Schumpeterian growth, have a willingness to take risk, and operate
with self-interest and foresight (Yallapragada & Bhuiyan, 2011). Small business lending
has been a complex journey because of the existence of tacit or soft information. Due to
competition in the resources of small businesses, credit extended to small businesses
tends to be rationed (Robinson, Akuetteh, Stone, Westhead, & Wright, 2013). Bank
lenders rely less on collateral if they have better information about borrowers (Berger &
Black, 2011; Gupta et al., 2014). Nevertheless, informational differences between formal
and informal lenders are crucial in developing financial markets and as an insight into a
better use of collateral based on soft quantitative information.
There are concerns about the relationship between firms and their lenders,
indicating no changing trend in the study of small business. However, industry experts
and small business owners suggest that the relationship between small businesses and
their lenders never improved. For example, the physical distance between small firms and
their lenders has increased and their interaction has become more impersonal, and the
approval of credit for financing continues to elude the small business sector (Banerjee &
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Duflo, 2014). The growing distance between small businesses and the banks, in the
presence of soft information, threatens the chances to improve small business credit and
the optimal heterogeneity which it enjoys (Antony, Klarl, & Maußner, 2012). Small firms
still look forward to a banking infrastructure that processes borrowing at a distance credit
and quality over time (Banerjee & Duflo, 2014). Among the European Union (EU), credit
history and the development of credit unions began as innovation and cooperation in
small business in Northern Britain over 20 years ago, according to the network-based
models of innovation-led economic development (Freel & Harrison, 2006).
With an outstanding record that small businesses represent 99% of employer
firms in the United States, the loan process tends to ignore accomplishments of small
business simply because of credit. The call report and data from the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) speak volumes of the discrepancies in the lending practice for
small businesses. The call reports measure outstanding loan balances by the location of
the lender’s headquarters (Williams, 2014). A comparison of the small businesses lending
call report and the CRA data report for 2012 and 2013 is shown in Table 1.
Literature Search and Statistics of SBB
According to Amel and Mach (2014), the total outstanding loans to small
businesses dropped substantially following the crisis. Incidentally, large loans began to
rebound by the third quarter of 2010—large lending finally returned to its previous
growth trajectory whereas small loans outstanding continued to decline in most
community banks. To address the decline or the perceived lack of supply of credit to
small businesses, the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) was created as part of the
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2010 Small Business Jobs Act, with the SBLF in charge to provide low-cost funding to
small businesses through community banks. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of
Treasury provided a report that SBLF participants had increased their small business
lending by $12.5 billion over their baseline numbers. Finally, the call report data from
community banks and thrift institutions provided a useful tool to evaluate the impact of
receiving funds from SBLF on their small business lending.
Nevertheless, the literature search strategy is incomplete without its
documentation. The objectives in documenting the literature search strategy are as
follows: to reflect lending patterns on the background of the study; to develop a
conceptual framework for the study; to find how the study fits previous studies; to judge
the quality of findings; and to see if further studies are needed. With that in mind, it was
important from the onset to define the topic of the study by consulting databases and
indexes.
The search strategy was instrumental in forming the present study as well as
reflecting on the past studies. For example, the seminal works of Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) and Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) have become the conceptual basis for
understanding the issue of credit constraints and CR. Overall, the quality of a study’s
search strategy determines the success of a research study.
Literature Search and Documentation in SBB
Literature gathering is important because the past decades have chronicled a
serious decline in small business credit. For the past three years, I used Walden
University’s Library to search for articles in the business management section related to
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the topic. I made use of EBSCOhost, Academic Search Premier, and sometimes
referenced Boolean operators for key terminologies. I also searched for articles on the
exact topics using DOIs. Nevertheless, in the three years of literature search, I
encountered the seminal works of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Steijvers and
Voordeckers (2009), whose conceptual findings are the pivotal pillar on which small
business credit and credit rationing concepts are defined. Furthermore, I searched the
current peer-reviewed literature as I was getting more information on the credit life of
small business when it becomes essential in borrowing.
Nevertheless, the literature search strategy is incomplete without its
documentation. The objectives in documenting the literature search strategy are to reflect
a lending pattern on the background of the study; to develop a conceptual framework for
the study; to find how the study fits into previous studies; to guide the determination of
the findings; and to see if further studies are needed. With that in mind, it is important
from the onset to define the topic of the study, which was done by consulting databases
and indexes such as EBSCOhost and Academic Premier.
The search strategy is instrumental in informing the present study as well as
reflecting on the past studies. For example, the seminal works of Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) and Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) have become the conceptual basis for
explaining and understanding the issue of credit constraints and CR in SBB. Further
findings to substantiate the obstacles younger, smaller firms face in financing,
particularly in the nonmanufacturing sector, is severely alarming (Dong & Men, 2014).
Nevertheless, the quality of a search strategy in a research study determines its outcome.
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Lending Structure in SBB
The U.S. government takes great interest in making loans affordable for small,
opaque businesses. Access to credit is essential to small business survival, growth, and
recovery, and the banking system in the United States is the supplier of credit for SBB
(Williams, 2014). Accordingly, the call report covers federally insured depository lending
institutions (saving banks, cooperative banks, savings and loan associations, and
commercial banks) except for credit unions and foreign banks. The call report and the
CRA report databases are used to evaluate how well lenders are meeting the credit needs
of small firms using the following four performance measures:
•

Number of loans;

•

Aggregate lending;

•

Total asset ratio; and

•

Total small business loan ratio.

The call report is a helpful medium for identifying individual lenders that are
investing in small business. The CRA, on the other hand, is an act of Congress enacted in
1977 with the intention of encouraging depository institutions to help meet the credit
needs of the communities. CRA helps to revitalize small business lending and community
empowerment at large. Table 1 is a comparison of call report and CRA data for 2013.
Table 1
Comparison of Call Report & CRA Data in the Small Business Lending Study, 2013

Data year

Call report data

CRA data

2013

2012
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Loan
information
provided

Stock of outstanding
business loan balance,
quarterly

Loans originated and purchased over
the calendar year

How loan
location is
identified

State in which the lender’s
headquarters is located

State in which the lender made the
loan

Reporting lenders:
depository lending
institutions and bank holding
companies

Depository lending institutions and
bank holding companies with
approximately $1 billion or more in
assets
Note. Adapted from “Small Business Lending in the United States 2013,” by V.
Williams, 2014, p. 10.
Lenders
reporting

To expand on small business lending practices, a review of small business capital
borrowing from 2008–2013 is presented for the study. The introduction of the study
along with the survey revealed a growing trend in small business debt usage. With
respect to small business lending in the United States for 2013, the call report concept,
with regards to lending ties, defines a small business loan to be $1 million or less, a micro
business loan to be between $100,000 and $1 million, and a large business loan to be
greater than $1 million (Di & Hanke, 2012; Williams, 2014). The survey also reported
that lenders made efforts to ease lending standards. Despite the attempts to ease lending
strategies and improve economic indicators, the pace of borrowing and lending in the
small business loan market remains weak (Williams, 2014). Though small businesses
significantly contribute to the growth of the economy, they are vulnerable to economic
downturns, and the evidence of tax advantage has no impact on small business debt.
Rather, tax laws allow businesses to reduce tax liability by deducting interest expenses
from taxable income.
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Though credit unions are not covered by the report of federally insured depository
lending institutions, they provide micro and social finance services to their members by
making available small loans to legal persons such as small owners (Mazure, 2011;
Williams, 2014). On the other hand, the 1960s gave witness to the U.S. government
cooperative and credit union development through its foreign assistance legislation that
included Canada, Australia, and other nations to form the international credit union
system. Unlike the United States, the credit rating agencies within the EU have a better
handle on conducting credit checks (Staikouras, 2012). The institution of a credit union
supports the small business owners and persons who are financially marginalized, as well
as help the European Commission to develop and expand micro-credit in many EU
regions.
A historical search for small business credit calls reflection upon a credit union as
a yardstick to study small business lending. With regards to the issues of consolidation,
the banking industry has a concern that small businesses are less able to obtain credit as
larger or non-local banks acquire community banks. The limitations of small businesses
are attributed to historical symbolism and the lack of a long track record, leaving them
often unknown to their local communities. The only medium to ensure communication
was through lending officers’ interactions, which banks have found profitable to have this
lending relationship with small businesses. Despite banks’ competitive edge and the
liberal policy of the National Credit Union Administration, the development of credit
unions has become an important source of banking and financial services in many
developed countries (Goddard, McKillop, & Wilson, 2014). Though large and small
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banks engage in small business lending, larger banks charge lower loan rates and require
collateral less often than small banks, attributable to former U.S. President Obama who
proposed the sum of $30 billion to assist small business lending after the 2008 financial
crisis (Bach, 2014). Despite the merger of banks to benefit small business financing,
theoretical work suggests that relationship lending is more common at the small bank
level than at large complex organizations.
With a new area in small business lending, social entrepreneurship examines how
small businesses develop in the economy. Social entrepreneurship is responsible in
helping underprivileged small business owners and hence improve the economy in the
long run. In the United States, entrepreneurship is frequent, for 1 in every 9 people are
self-employed (Fargione, Lehman, & Polasky, 2011). As stated in stakeholder theory, the
benefits of social entrepreneurship are to achieve outcomes and overcome, or limit,
negative influences on the physical environment (Mahoney, 2010; Surroca, Tribo, &
Waddock, 2010). Nevertheless, entrepreneurial activities target areas of social need but
eventually lead to the marketization of nonprofit organizations that do not then satisfy
societal needs.
Table 2
Value of Small Business Loans Outstanding by Loan Types and Size through 2014
(Billions of Dollars, Nominal)
Loan type
& size
Commerci
al real
estate

2012q1

2012q2

2012q3

2012q4

2013q1

2013q2

2013q3

2013q4

2014q1

2014q2
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Under
$100,000

18.6

18.0

17.9

17.5

17.0

16.8

16.4

16.3

16.1

15.8

53.8

53.1

52.6

51.9

51.2

50.5

50.3

50.0

49.5

49.3

238.5

236.7

235.1

232.8

230.8

229.3

228.5

228.5

227.5

226.8

311.0

307.8

305.7

302.2

299.0

296.6

295.2

294.8

293.0

291.8

120.0

120.2

119.5

120.2

122.9

124.1

122.8

125.2

126.7

129.6

45.8

46.5

46.0

47.0

46.8

47.2

46.4

46.7

47.7

48.3

113.3

114.0

113.5

117.2

115.7

116.7

114.6

115.1

117.4

120.0

279.1

280.6

279.0

284.3

285.3

288.1

283.9

287.0

291.8

297.9

Total
small
business
loans ($1
m or less)

590.1

588.5

584.7

586.5

584.3

584.7

579.1

581.9

584.8

589.7

Total
large
business
loans
(greater
than $1
m)

1,840.9

1,893.6

1,928.8

1,995.0

2,021.1

2,061.3

2,084.5

2,126.3

2,146.7

2,199.9

$100,000

–
$250,000
$250,000
– $1 m
Total
commerci
al real
estate
Commerci
al &
industrial
Under
$100,000
$100,000

–
$250,000
$250,000
– $1 m
Total
commerci
al &
industrial
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Total
business
loans
Total
assets of
depository
lenders
Number
of BHCs
&
independe
nt lenders

2,431.0

2,481.4

2,512.9

2,581.0

2,605.4

2,646.6

2,664.3

2,708.7

2,732.0

2,789.7

12,066.
5

12,187.
5

12,310.
7

25,187.
4

12,582.
8

12,618.
3

12,809.
8

12,939.
2

13,104.
4

13,364.
7

6,681

6,639

6,581

6,502

6,460

6,403

6,369

6,301

6,246

6,185

Note. BHC = bank holding company. Adapted from Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Statistics on Depository Institutions (June 2012 through June 2014).
On the other hand, the socioeconomics of small business lending is essential as it
stimulates changes in the financial sector. In a comparative study from 2003–2013, the
contributions from private and public sector banks helped the socioeconomics of India to
grow. A further study cited a relationship improvement between non-performing assets
(NPA) and return on assets of banks. Nevertheless, the socioeconomic responsiveness
and its impact on NPA level have been increasing between social compulsion and NPA
level. As well, declines in bank health do affect borrowers’ voluntary disclosures. Lo
(2014), in trying to explore the eroding lending relationships between borrowers and their
lenders, cited that “when banking relationships are threatened, borrowers must turn to
new funding sources, inducing them to reconsider their disclosure policies” (p. 542).
Table 2 demonstrated changes in dollar values based on the report definition
concept, officially known as the report of condition and income, on the lending size for
small business for the indicated period. Many factors account for the changes in dollar
amount, and the interest payment from tax savings could have a significant impact on the
decision of the business to take on high levels of debt. Nevertheless, bank lending took a
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new turn in 2007 in the wake of a subprime financial crisis. At that point, global
measures under the Basel Accord framework were taken to guide the sufficiency of
adequate capital in sustaining the ailing banking industry (Maredza, 2016).
The CRA formed in 1977 along with the charge to serve the credit needs of lowand moderate-income areas, including traditionally excluded minority residential areas
(Bates & Robb, 2015). Though the CRA was formed to address the credit needs of lowand moderate-income areas, the inability to access credit and liquidity continue to be
challenging problems, especially in small businesses lending (Cortes & McKinnis, 2012).
Table 3
Value of Small Business Loans Outstanding (CRE and C&I), 2008–2013
Loan type &
size at
origination
Commercial
real estate

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Change
2012–2013
Amount %

Less than
$100,000

28.5

26.4

22.1

19.8

18.0

16.8

-1.2

-6.7

$100,000–
$250,000

68.6

67.1

59.6

56.4

53.1

50.5

-2.6

-4.9

$250,000–
$1 m

277.9

278.4

260.5

247.8

236.7

229.3

-7.4

-3.1

375.0

372.0

342.3

323.9

307.8

296.6

-11.2

-3.6

141.7

134.5

137.2

119.8

120.2

124.1

3.9

3.2

Total small
commercial
real estate
Commercial
& industrial
Less than
$100,000
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$100,000–
$250,000

57.3

55.1

51.2

47.3

46.3

47.3

1.0

2.2

$250,000 to
$1 m

137.4

133.6

121.6

116.0

113.5

117.3

3.8

3.3

336.4

323.2

309.9

283.0

280.1

288.7

8.7

3.1

711.5

695.2

652.2

606.9

587.8

585.3

-2.5

-0.4

1,797.8

1,755.3

1.599.1

1,691.2

1,893.6

2,061.3

167.7 8.9

2,509.3

2,450.6

2,251.3

2,298.2

2,481.5

2,646.6

165.2

6.7

11,708.4

11,905.1

11,707.5

11,816.8

12,187.5

12,618.3

430.8

3.5

7,360

7,224

7,023

6,826

6,639

6,403

Total small
commercial
& industrial
Total small
business
loans ($1 m
or less)
Total large
business
loans
(greater than
$1 m)
Total
business
loans
Total assets
of depository
lenders
Number of
BHCs &
independent
lenders

-236.0 -3.6

Note. CRE = commercial real estate; C&I = commercial and industrial; BHC = bank
holding company. Adapted from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statistics on
Depository Institutions (June 2008 through June 2013).
Table 3 enumerated the different facets of small business loan type, according to
loan sizes, and extended to point out the differences and percentages of the value of the
loan to each loan asset. In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007, outstanding loans to
small businesses by commercial banks dropped sharply. Though large loans outstanding
began to rise by the third quarter of 2010, small loans outstanding were on the decline.
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According to the results from McNulty, Murdock, and Richie (2013), the propensity to
lend to small business declines as banks increase and the growth in small business
lending does not match in the same regard to the growth in bank size.
Based on the SSBF, large banks did most small business lending. Accordingly,
many researchers in their studies evaluate the propensity to lend to SMEs as a ratio of
small business loans to the total assets. A more comprehensive data source, such as the
bank call report with federal regulators, provides a better analysis of the relationship
between lending propensity and bank asset size. The ratio includes investment assets,
trading account assets, and other assets that would reflect a significant portion of large
banks.
Table 4
Total Asset Ratios, 2008–2013 (Value of Small Business Loans Outstanding to the Value
of Total Lender Assets, Percent)

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Change
2012–2013
Difference %

Less than $100,000

1.61

1.48

1.37

1.21

1.13

1.07

-0.06

-5.3

$100,000–
$250,000

1.81

1.80

1.77

1.74

1.66

1.63

-0.03

-1.8

$250,000–
$1 m

5.91

6.14

6.14

6.01

5.82

5.73

-0.09

-1.5

9.33

9.42

9.28

8.96

8.61

8.43

-0.18

-2.1

Loan type & size
Commercial real
estate

Total small
commercial real
estate
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Commercial &
industrial
Less than $100,000

2.69

2.40

2.22

1.99

1.86

1.80

-0.06

-3.2

$100,000–
$250,000

1.40

1.34

1.27

1.21

1.16

1.15

-0.01

-0.9

$250,000–
$1 m

2.85

2.73

2.58

2.47

2.37

2.35

-0.02

-0.8

6.94

6.47

6.06

5.67

5.39

5.30

-0.09

-1.7

Total small
commercial &
industrial

Total small business
16.27 15.89 15.34 14.63 14.00 13.73 -0.27
-1.9
loans
Note. Adapted from Federal Depository Insurance Corporation, Statistics on Depository
Institutions (June 2008 through June 2013).
Table 4 reflects the call report in which the concept of total asset ratios was
discussed. In the report, the performance of a small business lender is measured as a
percentage of the total assets and total business loans. The measure of the total amount of
small business loans to the lender’s total assets is the total asset ratio—a portion
representative of the lender’s assets that is allocated to small business loans. The total
asset ratio has declined for lenders in all asset size categories as lender size increases
(Williams, 2014).
The studies by Kaya and Banerjee (2012, 2014) discuss U.S. manufacturing
firms’ short-term assets, liabilities, term structure of debt, and liquidity management
ratios as they affect firm size, profitability, tangibility, market-to-book ratio, and
leverage. The study is a continuation of the impact of business cycles on the assets of
retail and wholesale trade firms. The Federal Reserve played a role in its policy on firm’s
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short-term financial management (with regards to cash and short-term investment),
accounts receivable, inventories, account payables, term structures of debt holding, and
liquidity ratios.
The effort to review the implication of policymakers as well as managers on a
firm’s characteristics to include the financial management measures in the review—shortterm assets, liabilities, term structures of debt holdings, and liquidity ratios—gained
support. Nevertheless, it is advisable in the recovery stage for firms to adopt the assetliability management strategies during the decline of a business circle. Furthermore, the
study indicated that a rise in the interest rate does increase the amount of accounts
receivable through the increased demand for trade credit, as uncovered in Swedish listed
companies (Rimo & Panbunyuen, 2010).
Theoretical Foundation
Consistent with quantitative research, I sought the use of theory (a set of
constructs) to specify the relationships that existed among the variables in my research to
explain research phenomena. The main assumption in this study’s model was that small
business lending and credit constraints are built based on economic transaction models,
with potential cost components driving the outcome of the paradigm, as reflected in the
seminal works of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009). The
cost components associated with the model include writing small business contracts,
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing contracts. In the model, the rationale is that CR
provides a solution to the age-old small business credit constraint in a market driven by
improper information gathering. To substantiate the effect of CR on small business,
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Becchetti, Garcia, and Trovato (2011), in analyzing the attitude of small businesses
towards credit constraint, posited that “commercial banks may ration credit and fix a
nonmarket-clearing lending rate that create excess demand for loans because they know
that a higher interest rate could create a moral hazard and adverse selection” (p. 1222). It
follows that CR presents some issues on small business credit because there is always an
existence of disequilibrium between the amounts of supply and demand in loanable funds
for each borrower of financial obligation regardless of credit.
In this study, I addressed the theoretical reasoning of small business credit lending
by overviewing CR in an LGS setting. Though credit problems may persist, loan
guarantee remains a viable tool in relaxing the constraints for SMEs, and the use of
personal guarantees is an indication of transaction-based lending (Peltoniemi & Vieru,
2013). Improper information gathering may have a negative impact on small business
credit and, with greater uncertainty during business cycles, may potentially exacerbate
CR (Craig, Jackson, & Thomson, 2011). Overall, informational problems in small
business credit can produce a market equilibrium that potentially causes lenders to
undersupply loans with enough severity that leads to CR and consequently credit market
failure.
In debt financing, credit risk has been manifested as the underlining problem for
small business. The continuously evolving economic conditions in which firms operate
their idiosyncratic nature and even the efforts of small businesses to change firm-specific
characteristics are subject to uncertainty (Quijano, 2013). Credit risk in small businesses
is of particular interest to U.S. financial institutions because 24.9% of small business

43
loans come in the form of commercial and industrial loans (June, 2011). The overall
study captures and confirms capital allocation inefficiencies and reaffirmed default risk in
U.S. loans portfolios as depicted in Basel II.
Literature Review
Several major studies have examined SBB and found that credit constraints
played a mitigating role in the history of SBB (Antony, Klari, & Maußner, 2012). The
literature of small business lending constituted hard information on the creditworthiness
of borrowers. Information technology has been the primary driver for the increase in
information gathering in small business borrower-lender relationships in the United
States. The following terms—relationship borrowing, adverse selection, moral hazard,
information asymmetry, collateral, and credit rationing—played a dominant role in this
literature review.
Relationship Borrowing
Access to information technology includes but is not limited to hard information
about borrower creditworthiness, which allows banks to lend with more distance to small
businesses without compromising in the areas of credit, monitoring the borrowers, and
intervening when necessary (DeYoung, Frame, Glennon, & Nigro, 2011). Large banks
have the advantage in using hard information (informationally transparent from large,
opaque firms) to process lending whereas small banks, using informationally transparent
information, have the comparative advantage in lending to small, opaque firms (Berger &
Black, 2011). Though lenders do use hard information as a monopolistic exploitation on
small firms, small firms benefit in return from an increased credit availability because of
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a better relationship. In analyzing bank-borrowing relationships, there is a comparative
advantage in using hard information lending technologies (transaction-based lending),
which result in an increase in the size of the firm. Overall, Gopalan, Udell, and Yerramilli
(2011) indicated that “firms obtain higher loan amounts when they foam new banking
relationships, while small firms experience an increase in sales growth, capital
expenditure, leverage, analyst coverage, and public debt issuance subsequently” (p.
1335).
Again, technology is an important segment in resource and organizational setup
for small business. In examining small businesses designed for information and
communication technologies (ICTs), ICTs have single-handedly enhanced small business
competitiveness (Alonso-Almeida & Llach, 2013). Furthermore, organizational impact
felt like ICTs led to small firm survivability and profitability. On the contrary, the
adoption and use of ICTs in small service companies have only been partially studied
(Hotho & Champion, 2011; Sommer & Haug, 2011). Accordingly, small business
adopting ICTs is good because ICTs are the key driver of company competitiveness,
organization, and strategic development but must go hand-in-hand with staff and
organizational changes.
A cross-section panel study done on banks from 1994–2002 suggested that small
banks, when compared with those of larger banks, do escalate their commitments to bad
loans (Ogura & Uchida, 2014). Furthermore, relational exchange arrangements are vital
in their role in governing and influencing the outcome in relationship banking (Lado et
al., 2008; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Reddy & Czepiel, 1999). Large banks use standardized
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quantitative criteria to assess loans applications, but small banks develop relationships
with their customers by building reliance on qualitative criteria based on personal
interaction with applicants when processing their loans (Berger & Udell, 1995; Cole et
al., 2004). It has been shown that the result of a study was felt not in small businesses, but
across small and medium-sized entrepreneurship. At this point, one can emphatically
state that relationship lending, a situation where banks invest in building their
relationship with borrowers, is exploited to compete in the small business loan market. A
good banking relationship develops when a lender repeatedly provides credit to a firm.
Rosenfeld (2014) cited “that there is the notion that banking relationships alleviate
information asymmetry through continued contact with their customers” (p. 404).
Studies by Wu and Chua (2012) exploring SBB reported a second-order case of
gender discrimination based on treatment meted out to U.S. small business borrowers.
Indeed, sex and race discriminations are perpetuated by the officials of the banks. A 2003
NSSBF by the Federal Reserve Board resolved the gender assignment problem of lenders
by charging female sole proprietorships more than their male counterparts when
borrowing money to expand their businesses (Deitch & Hegewisch, 2013).
In trying to dissect the differences in small business credit rationing, it was noted
that small business owners experience ethnic discriminations when obtaining a loan. Selfemployment for minorities (Blacks and Hispanics) is viewed as a source of innovation
and an avenue out of poverty and unemployment. However, minority-owned small
businesses experienced discrimination by banks when accessing a bank loan (Mijid &
Bernasek, 2013). Educational gap, lower asset level, and a smaller probability of having
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self-employment are among the reasons for the discrimination between Blacks and
Whites, and these reasons account for minorities to fail to succeed or make profit when
compared to their White counterparts (Fairlie, Robb, & Hinson, 2010). Furthermore,
many Title VII lawsuits and settlements have occurred from discrimination, resulting in
organizational change in human resource departments and practice. Deitch and
Hegewisch (2013), in exploring the implications of race discrimination litigation, cited
that “discrimination lawsuit settlements are a potential impetus for improved diversity
management policies” (p. 425). Overall, discrimination has a negative influence in
changing the atmosphere of the workforce and can lead to lawsuits, which costs the
system and the public in the long run.
Adverse Selection in SBB
Small businesses are faced with problems when borrowing from commercial
banks. Nevertheless, the problem is more manifested in an equilibrium loan market
characterized by improper information gathering, which leads to CR. The riskiness of the
loan translates to a higher interest rate charged by commercial banks (Stiglitz & Weiss,
1981). Since the probability of repayment is high, it is difficult to identify borrowers who
are most likely to repay these loans; hence, adverse selection occurs.
Adverse selection is the inefficiency between bank managers (agents) and the
investors (principals/firm owners), arising from improper information gathering and poor
contractual arrangements. Overall, the complex, dynamic principal-agent setting, along
with the situations of moral hazard and adverse selection, lies on the quality of the
agent’s private information (Gershkov & Perry, 2012). The agent’s decision to accept or
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refuse a task is critical for public perception. When the problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard are added, they produce a situation incentive for information revelation
(Sung, 2005).
Moral Hazard Problem in SBB
Moral hazard stems from an agent’s ineptitude to consider the full consequence of
their actions as they relate to a borrower’s risk factors. Moral hazard is an ex-post
problem that occurs when borrowers do not use the funds for the designated purpose as a
result of information gathered and on the terms of the contract (Ata, Korpi, Ugurlu, &
Sahin, 2015). Nevertheless, when lenders are unable to monitor the operations as they
appertain to lending and the process of SBB, they lack the good faith needed for the
contract.
LGS
Many studies have chronicled small business lending practices amid credit
constraints, but only a few studies have discussed LGS as a direct subsidization and
alternative to CR (Kuo, Chen, & Sung, 2011). Financing small businesses is an important
exercise for the economy. Small business loans come as an external finance from
commercial banks (Peltoniemi & Vieru, 2013). The importance of guarantees in bank
lending cannot be overemphasized, but the role played by adding collateral to personal
guarantees (collateral guarantees) lowers the interest rate of secured loans (Calcagnini,
Farabullini, & Giombini, 2014). Regarding the Basel Capital Accords and its relationship
to secured loans, the role of guarantees helps determine the cost of credit availability,
especially during economic crises. Overall, the issue of what role the personal guarantee
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has in the context of relationship banking is still ambiguous, despite the ways the banks
claim to process lending. Collateralization tools, on the other hand, help banks to assess
the price and risk of a requested loan; in return, they help the banks generate fewer credit
losses when compared to the effect of improper information gathering.
Owing to the erratic and seasonal cash flow of small business capital, the
governments of many developing nations use CGS as a financial instrument to alleviate
financial constraints for small businesses. To improve the flow of financial resources to
small business includes direct and special lending programs, government-funded
wholesale credit, CGS, interest subsidies, and regulative subsidies (Chen & Sung, 2011;
Tunahan & Dizkirici, 2012). CGS intervening, as a measure to address market
imperfection, alleviates financial constraints among small businesses (Gurmessa &
Ndinda, 2014). It is important to note that the impact and role of CGS stretched beyond
providing access to small enterprises, and its impact on credit guarantees for SMEs and
other sectors is of theoretical importance (Tunahan & Dizkirici, 2012). Nevertheless,
many developed countries of the world use CGS to alleviate credit constraints in small
enterprises, such as farmers and cooperatives, making it a widely used tool by the
government and other agencies to improve entrepreneurship and provide access to formal
credit.
CGS has been an important tool for new and service-based industries of
immediate finance without any forms of security attached in return for lending
requirements. In essence, CGS enables small businesses to gain access to finance for
venture creation and development (Samujh, Twiname, & Reutemann, 2012). For many
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countries, it has been proven that CGS is a viable tool, in times of financial difficulties,
for SMEs to access needed finance and liquidity when lending is squeezed (Arraiz,
Melendez, & Stucchi, 2014). The government enables CGS initiatives to take place as it
pursues the initiatives through the ministry in charge of economic and social development
to set apart funds to support guarantees to disadvantaged small businesses. The initiatives
that guide CGS are carefully designed to assist targeted economic activities in
communities or some types of investments.
Another government mechanism arranged to finance SMEs is an LGS. According
to a global study by Bannock (1997), it was reported that 85 countries claimed to have
benefited from LGS between 1995 and 1997. Nevertheless, more SMEs count on a small
and medium enterprise credit guarantee fund for guarantees to access debt capital from
banks (Kuo et al., 2011). The government can adjust the guarantee fees and guarantee
percentage to influence take-up rates of the LGS. Evidence shows that banks have
developed coping mechanisms to deal with some of the difficulties associated with LGS
by hedging risk (Arraiz, Melendez, & Stucchi, 2014). Finally, the issue of setting
guarantee fees to accommodate findings between an appropriate balances and
maintaining a reasonable guarantee capacity for supporting SMEs, without damaging
their financial health, has been on the forefront.
Concerns over the provision of government programs for SMEs has created a
forum for debate. Since financial institutions face high borrowing costs during economic
times and low borrowing costs during recessions, the federal government could offer
insurance coverage in the form of loan guarantees to ease borrowing constraints (Jia,
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2012). Criticisms have arisen over the ways the federal government handles the SBA’s
guarantee programs such as maintaining a negative subsidy rate during the period when
the agency was making a profit. It is important to emphasize that without the “zero
subsidy” policy in place, the SBA loan guarantee programs generate profit for the
government, and hence it is questionable when the government provides aggregate
insurance relative to financial institution borrowing.
Information Asymmetries in SBB
The existence of information asymmetries in SBB has a stronghold on the poor.
MFIs have been instrumental in lending to poor, opaque borrowers at the bottom of the
economic pyramid (Galariotis, Villa, & Yusupov, 2011). In a credit market setting,
asymmetric information arises as a failure between the lender and borrower to exchange
complete and correct information (Ata, Korpi, Ugurlu, & Sahin, 2015). Though the use of
collateral remains an agency mitigating tool, a large amount of debate fails to account for
the social mission of microfinance in terms of contract enforcement. Although the issue
of repayment remains a concern for borrowers, the rationale to continue to extend funds
to those who fail induces borrowers to exert more effort as long as successful borrowers
are granted access to more funds. On the contrary, a conflicting view on the concept of
borrowing arises: As a relationship develops between borrowers and banks, access to
better credit conditions grows, which improves lending to borrowers.
Borrowing exposure constitutes material risk concentrations within banks, and
information asymmetry in a lender-borrower relationship affects the credit decision for
small business owners. Since large and small firms can minimize information asymmetry,
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it is important to know what firm size impacts information imperfection (Brent & Addo,
2012). On the contrary, bank consolidation on bank acquisition of soft information on
small business borrowers has an impact on the merger of small banks with an opposite
effect on large banks. Ogura and Uchida (2014), when explaining bank consolidation and
soft information acquisition, stated that “further evidence suggests that the lack of such
an effect for large banks is because large banks do not accumulate sufficient soft
information irrespective of their merger experience” (p. 175). As the literature is not
exhaustive from the perspective of whether a large or small firm can minimize
information asymmetry better, Hochberg (2010) noted that small business, as being the
engine of economic growth, needed to be encouraged because of their dominance in
providing employment and social welfare for the nation. Hochberg’s characterization
suggests that small businesses pose a higher risk for lenders regarding higher information
asymmetry, yet no empirical evidence is given to buttress the view that small firms are
more efficient at minimizing information asymmetry.
Economic variables move asymmetrically over the business circle. Worldwide, it
has been observed that asymmetry tends to rise quickly during a crisis but falls slowly
and gradually during recovery (Ordonez, 2015). Mexico’s 1994–95 crisis was a typical
asymmetric case where real lending rose 70% points in four months, and investment and
output per capita dropped 35% and 17% points in three quarters, respectively. Through
the endogenous variables of asymmetry (lending rates, investment, and output), the
construct of credit spread and innovation components orthogonal to the current state to
the decline of economic activity (Turvey, Xu, Kong, & Cao, 2014). Finally, it could be
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deduced that learning financial differences induces differences in the time irreversibility
of endogenous variables that show up in their asymmetry.
Collateral in SBB
The use of collateral in accessing loans has been widely accepted as an important
contracting tool. Collateral is a prominent feature of debt contract in residential
mortgages, commercial mortgages, motor vehicle loans, and equipment loans (Berger,
Frame, & Loannidou, 2011). Evidence has shown that collateral could raise the
borrower’s cost default; hence, a better preference is that secured debt is less likely to
default, irrespective of whether ex-ante asymmetric information is indicated (Berger,
Frame, & Ioannidou, 2011). Nevertheless, there are no conclusive empirical tests on
whether a better bank relationship with borrowers improves when collateral is pledged.
Consistent with the contributions that entrepreneurs and micro, small, and
medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) make to the economy, a better understanding needs
to be reached with respect to the factors that influence the rise and performance of
MSMEs. Prior to 2001–2004, the study of Bah, Brada, and Yigit (2011) covered MSMEs
in transition economies where the performance of MSMEs was limited. Microenterprises
were being awarded no bank credit. Bah, Brada, and Yigit, in trying to control for
selection bias for assistance to small and medium programs by the United States Agency
for International Development, determined that assistance programs raised employment
by 16–20% in the first year (after assistance) and by 23–30% by the third year. Based on
these statistics, the number of loans is evenly distributed across classes for cash flow
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loans although more loans are distributed as collateral loans. Overall, the cash flow loans
appear to be the best credit option for SMEs.
The article on banking regulations from firms is a determination of what
constitutes a firm’s proportion of collateralized loans. Within the context of Chinese
loans, the incidence of loan default has been on the increase in the past 30 years, making
collateral requirements ever more important (Jianchun & Daly, 2012). Other than the
developed economies of the United States and Europe, China is the biggest developing
economy where changes in the banking system affect collateral. In 2003, the China
Banking Regulatory Commission was regulated to monitor commercial banks and issue
guidelines on due diligence in credit work of commercial banks.
Credit Rationing in SBB
Credit rationing is a situation that arises when a borrower’s request for additional
credit (loan) is met with a higher interest repayment. Credit rationing occurs when the
demand for loans exceed its supply (Ata, Korpi, Ugurlu, & Sahin, 2015). Small
businesses in regions of the developing world face different microeconomic conditions,
more volatile macroeconomic situations, a less efficient market, and higher entry costs
than their counterparts that live in high-income economies. Bond, Tybout, and Utar
(2015) analyzed the microeconomic conditions militating against small businesses in
developing economies and posited that “the literature documenting these pattern of
financial development is vast” (p. 695). The findings in Jianchun and Daly (2012) reflect
a dynamic structural model of entrepreneurship with uncertainty in its borrowing
constraints and a wealth consensus with several dynamic general equilibrium models.
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Furthermore, what Jianchun and Daly found is in line with several empirical models of
dynamic industrial constraints and uncertainty with cost adjustments. Overall, it is only
fair in a capital market if borrowers are evaluated in such a manner that borrowing does
not exceed a fixed ratio of their entrepreneurial assets.
The problem in the banking sector arises because of the presence of information
asymmetry. Accordingly, the failure of borrowers and lenders to exchange complete and
correct information with each other leads to improper information gathering (Ata et al.,
2015). Er (2011) stated that adverse selection and moral hazard occurs “when demands
for loans exceeds the supply, and for borrowers who have agreed to repay them, credit
(loan) is rationed” (p. 311). Borrowers can improve rationing with external auditing.
Although costly, external auditing has the tendency to increase transparency and send a
quality signal to potential lenders. St-Pierre and Bahri (2011), in analyzing the
determinants of risk premium for SMEs with respect to loan size, observed that loan
conditions must be based on the borrower’s ability to repay and the risk of default. It is
equally important to mention that the age and quality of a firm also constitutes a
mitigating factor to CR.
The Review of Related Research and the Literature Comparison in SBB
The literature review brings to light the underlying reasons for small business loan
denial in the study. It is humbling to discuss the role racial and ethnic differences play in
accessing loans. Small businesses owned by minorities are increasing tremendously with
an increase of 1.9 million Black-owned nonfarm U.S. businesses, an increase of 60.5%
from 2002, and Hispanic-owned nonfarm U.S. businesses increased by 2.3 million, an
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increase of 43.6% (Mijid & Bernasek, 2013). Despite the statistical increase, minorityowned businesses in the United States tend to be less successful because of higher loan
denial.
Another study addressed a different type of problem based on social interaction in
justifying disconnect between borrowers and lenders attributes that constitute problems in
small business lending (Turvey, Xu, Kong, & Cao, 2013). With the United Nations
declaring 2005 the international year of microcredit, microfinance institutions in their
dynamic view extended small loans to poor, opaque borrowers with the view to advance
lending to the poor with asymmetric information (Galariotis, Villa, & Yusupov, 2011).
The sole purpose for MFIs to extend small unsecured loans to poor, opaque small
businesses is to channel capital from profit-seeking investors and socially driven donors
to those poor small business owners who lack the basic collateral to obtain funds through
the conventional credit market.
Ata, Korpi, Ugurlu, and Sahin (2015) viewed the problem small businesses
encountered when accessing loans to adverse selection and moral hazard, a situation that
arises in the banking sector when improper information gathering occurs. Ata et al.
cautioned that banks use a credit rationing mechanism to mitigate the losses that arise
because of asymmetric information. Though banks use CR to mitigate asymmetric
information in the credit market, it happens when borrowers and lenders fail to exchange
complete and correct information.
Incidentally, the studies of Galariotis et al. (2011) and Ata et al. (2015) pointed to
the effect of improper information gathering on SBB, but the outcome is felt differently.
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According to Galariotis et al., with respect to MFIs, the situation in lending to small,
opaque borrowers is seen as a new way of lending that imposes joint liability when
mitigating the effect of asymmetric information. Similarly, Ata et al. used a credit
rationing mechanism to cushion bank losses that occur due to improper information
gathering.
Another study addressed a different type of problem based on social interactions
in a lender-borrower relationship across a wide range of lending-related attributes which
created a big problem (Turvey, Xu, Kong, & Cao, 2013). The study compared 120 loan
officers at rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) in China’s Shandong province and paired
them with an existing survey on identical questions to 394 farm households in the same
region. In the process, pairing lender perception towards borrowers, loan rejection, and
memberships of RCC microcredit lending mechanism against borrowers’ perception
towards lenders—and how they themselves were perceived by lenders in the same
regards—are observed as a disconnect in the context of lending, which invariably
increased the cost of borrowing.
Borrowers’ attitude towards lenders and lending can also be observed when farms
in Kansas sought additional lending relationships to secure credit at a future date
(Brewer, Wilson, Featherstone, & Langemeier, 2014). In the process, if either the farm or
the bank believes the other is risky, the result is that the farm seeks an additional lending
relationship that readily enables the farm access to credit. The study of Brewer et al.
(2014) has a better outlook on lending relationships in contrast to the study done by
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Turvey et al. (2013) which lacks positive emphasis and encouragement in small business
lending.
The Gap in the Literature
The literature review cannot come to a conclusive summary without identifying
the gaps in the research on small business lending. This study fills the current research
gap by identifying LGS as an alternative to commercial bank credit rationing. With LGS,
all a small business owner does to qualify for this government financing option is provide
employment and social welfare to the community where they serve. Furthermore, with
LGS, small business owners do not have to worry about providing collateral as a
requirement to obtain loans because of the government provision for self-financing, based
on the criteria of employment and social welfare to the community (Kuo et al., 2011).
Unlike CR, where collateral plays a dominant role, the qualified small business pays a
token called guarantee fees (premiums). Kuo et al. (2011) cited that “since guarantee fees
(premiums) represent the largest cash inflow for a guarantor and the most critical index to
indicate a borrower’s credit status, this paper proposes a methodology that specifically
aims for this self-financing target by meeting at least default costs with income from
premiums” (p. 205).
It is apparent that small businesses are viewed as a source of job creation and the
engine of economic growth, despite the difficulties they experience in accessing debt
finance driven by financial market inefficiency. Loan guarantee programs as a major
component of entrepreneurship policies offer a form of insurance protection in North
America. Jia (2013) stated that the SBA provides nearly $100 billion in loans to U.S.
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small business owners in the form of loan guarantees. Likewise, the Canadian Small
Business Financing Program provides nearly $1 billion of guarantee funds in new loans
annually. More importantly, loan guarantees could be seen as an insurance against small
business aggregate risks. Jia (2013), in addressing the benefit of LGS in easing borrowing
constraints during a recession, concluded that “the federal government could offer
insurance in the form of loan guarantees to ease borrowing constraints for small
businesses” (p. 455).
In practice, LGS provided for SMEs in a variety of ways. LGS, as recognized in
the Basel Capital Accords, has the potential to determine not only the availability of
small business credit, especially during economic crisis, but also the cost (Calcagnini,
Farabullini, & Giombini, 2014). This process is achieved when banks use collateral and
personal guarantees on the interest rate of a bank loan. A case in point is the effect of
collateral guarantee and on the cost of credit for Italian firms.
Furthermore, the study explored the usefulness of LGS as insurance against
aggregate risks in SMEs. As often noted with LGS, its effect in determining the cost and
the availability of credit is mostly felt during economic downturns when firms experience
credit constraint, mostly due to aggregate uncertainty in the economy (Cowling, 2010).
Since firms encounter disproportionate difficulties in accessing debt financing, especially
in North America, loan guarantee programs have become a major mechanism to shelter
entrepreneurship policy as a result of financial market inefficiencies (Jia, 2013).
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Conclusion
Chapter 2 discussed the relevant literature guiding the topic and terms of the
study. Furthermore, Chapter 2 identified and discussed credit factors that limit the ability
for small businesses to access commercial loans and loans from other lending institutions.
Assumptions, theoretical frameworks, relationship lending, LGS, and collateral were
discussed throughout the literature review. Information asymmetry plays a major
mitigating factor in small business lending. In addition, discipline deficiency among
lenders remains a deciding mechanism in awarding loan contracts to SMEs. Many small
business owners lack the moral discipline when choosing from the ruling interest rate
because of improper information gathering against them. The identification of these
factors and the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss were instrumental for the
methodology and statistical analyses of this study, which are discussed in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Overview
The purpose of this study was to use small business data sets to quantitatively test
the influence of LGS on CR, controlling for the effects of COLL and LEV. The seminal
theory of CR from Stiglitz and Weiss has been dubbed “the workhorse Stiglitz-Weiss
model of credit rationing” (Agur, 2012, p. 220), and it remains the theoretical framework
for this study. Even though this theory was propounded in 1981, researchers have been
using it since then, with Agur (2012) describing it as “the cornerstone of analytical
thinking about credit rationing for nearly three decades” (p. 221). Therefore, past and
current research are integrated to underpin the conceptual work in this study.
According to the theory from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), lenders (banks) fail to
extend the full amount of credit that would reflect the correct assessment of information
available at the time the credit contract is done. That is, CR occurs when banks deny
loans to some borrowers who have the same characteristics as those that receive the loan.
In this sense, a small business loan borrower is said to be credit rationed if the demand
for a loan is greater than the amount of loan offered, which is an example of loan
rationing (Drakos & Giannakopoulos, 2011; Mason, 2014; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).
Consequently, once loan rationing occurs, problems arise such as adverse
selection and moral hazards. From the past decades to the present, scholars have been
wrestling with research problems related to the causes and consequences of CR. For
example, Ferri and Murro (1980) concluded more than three decades ago that “the recent
survey by Baltensperger shows that the question of why bankers undertake non-price
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rationing of credit is still very much unanswered” (p. 471). It may be argued that the
Stiglitz and Weiss theory of CR is old. Scholars recognize this fact but express their
concern that no recent theory on CR has been propounded to replace it, with Agur (2012)
concluding that “in particular, the model of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981; henceforth SW) has
been the cornerstone of analytical thinking about credit rationing for nearly three
decades” and explicitly stating that the Stiglitz and Weiss model “is certainly the best
known and most often applied model” (p. 221). Therefore, the present study makes a
contribution towards filling the long-standing research gap on the causes and
consequences of small business credit rationing using the theoretical underpinning of
Stiglitz and Weiss’s 1981 theory on CR.
Five major sections make up this chapter. The first section deals with the research
design and rationale. The second section deals with the population as well as the
sampling and sampling procedures. The third section presents the procedures for
recruitment of participants and data collection procedures. The fourth section covers the
operationalization of constructs. Finally, the fifth section discusses the data analysis plan
and threats to validity and ends with a summary.
Research Design and Rationale
It has been well established that a sound research design should begin with the
definition of the problem for the study (Field, 2013; Singh, 2007). Following this
suggestion, I allowed the potential solution to the research problem to suggest the suitable
methodology for this study. That is, the research problem should dictate the methodology
used for the study, not vice versa (Babbie, 2010; Field, 2013).
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Several methodological issues arose when contemplating the research design and
rationale for this study. As in other empirical research, the epicenter of this study is the
CR of small businesses. Evidently, the operationalization of the dependent variable (CR)
demands metrics or hard data, which is difficult to find (Park & Coleman, 2009; Petrick,
2005). Indeed, Park and Coleman (2009) declared that “researchers cannot always
observe how much credit a firm needs or how much of that need is met by the credit
supplied by the bank” (p. 259). Therefore, the design of this study must seriously
consider where and how to gather the proper data set in a manner that data can be
physically observed and then extracted from the source (Petrick, 2005).
With these data stipulations in mind, it does appear that this study requires an
archival data set. The dependent variable (CR) should be measured as observable metric
data as opposed to survey-based perceptual data (Drakos & Giannakopoulos, 2011; Ferri
& Murro, 2015; Mason, 2013). Surely, perceptual (belief) data would be inferior to
metric or hard observable data, as perceptual data would raise more problems related to
non-response rate and potential validity and reliability concerns inherent in postal survey
questionnaire data sets, among other issues. With this statement in mind, this chapter
begins with providing information on the survey design, settings, and the statistical
analysis techniques for data analysis.
Research Setting
The setting for this archival-based, non-experimental, non-survey-based study
was the population of small businesses that have been credit rationed in Florida in 2015.
The reason for selecting this setting is that a literature search revealed that the study’s
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setting must have sampling frames capable of providing firm-level archival data on the
population of small businesses that have been credit rationed in Florida in 2015. The
following sampling frames emerged from the literature search: SSBF by the Federal
Reserve Bank (FED), and the SBA databases (SBA, 2016b).
However, it must be explicitly emphasized that the measurement of almost all the
variables involved in the present study require data from firm-level balance sheet entries.
Therefore, the research setting must focus on balance sheet information submitted to the
lender banks by small businesses when loan applications were submitted to the lender
banks. Hence, archival data for this study was gathered in a stepwise procedure from the
two sampling frames.
Methodology
Population
Interestingly, Singleton and Straits (2005) discussed a useful two-step sampling
approach to guide researchers. Specifically, they suggested that the first step in sampling
is to clearly determine the particular collection of units that make up the population of
interest of the study. The sound research approach should start from the top at the
population and work downward to the sample (Bailey, 1982; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, &
Jackson, 2008). To define the target population of interest to the study, the researcher
must first specify the criteria for determining which units should be included in the
population for the study (Singleton & Straits, 2005). In this study, the units to be included
in the target population were the small business firms within Florida. Another reason the
identification and clarification of the target population is critical—it is the specific
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population from where the researcher would eventually generalize or extrapolate the
results of the study obtained from the sample to that specific population (Bailey, 1982;
Churchill, 1979; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Field, 2013; Mijid & Alexandra, 2013)
Finally, key information culled from Singleton and Straits (2005) suggests that the
construction of the sampling frame is the second step in defining the sample for this
study. Hence, the sampling frame pinpoints the set of cases from which the sample is to
be drawn. For the sake of clarification, the sampling frame is not a sample, but an
operational definition of the population that provides the basis for sampling (Field, 2013;
Singleton & Straits, 2005).
Sampling and Sampling Procedure
The first aspect about sampling is the identification of the population from where
the sample should be drawn (Simon & Goes, 2013). Second is to explicitly discuss the
procedure of sampling from that population (Simon & Goes, 2013). Hence, following this
procedure, the population for this study was the small businesses in Florida that are credit
rationed in 2015.
The population of this study was found in the following archival locations:
NSSBF and the FED. It is public knowledge that the FED conducts its SSBF every five
years (Mills & McCarthy, 2014; Park & Coleman, 2009). The NSSBF database defines
small business firms as firms with 500 or fewer employees. Additionally, in using this
database, Park and Coleman (2009) commented that the NSSBF “is the largest and most
comprehensive data set of its type representing a national sample of firms stratified by
geographic region, industry sector, gender, and race” (pp. 257–8).
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Likewise, Mills and McCarthy (2014) recently commented on the richness of
information in the NSSBF database, declaring that “one of the best pictures we have of
sources and uses of credit by small businesses is the Federal Reserve’s National Survey
of Small Business Finances, which, while dated as of 2003, indicates that about 60
percent of small businesses use term loans to finance their operations” (p. 18). Evidently,
“the best pictures” in the NSSBF database relate to the following data on firm
characteristics, including, but not limited to, firm size, firm age, profitability,
metropolitan statistical area, industry type, sales, assets, and more (Park & Coleman,
2009). Overall, the NSSBF databases have the information on the variables to be
operationalized for this study. However, in the highly unlikely event that the variables of
this study were not available in the NSSBF databases, the same data pertinent to this
study were extracted from the SBA databases. Surely, in designing this study, months of
literature and databases searches revealed that the NSSBF and SBA databases store
archival data pertinent to this study, as confirmed by other scholars (e.g., Mills &
McCarthy, 2014; Park & Coleman, 2009).
Second, some of the data are available for a fee in websites such as
www.whodoessbaloans.com. Beyond this source, SBA officers are willing to assist
students who need help with data for purely academic purposes. For example, the office
of Mr. Miguel Gonzalez [(305) 536-5521, ext. 141] in Miami, Florida assists students
who may need data for academic research. Furthermore, the South Florida Small
Business Resource Guide contains information on active SBA lenders to small
businesses, including information on loans applied for as well as loans received by small
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businesses in Florida. Again, the archival data are ready-made data for assisting students
for research purposes and involving no procedure for recruitment in data collection for
the study.
Third, and finally, the population is found on SBA (SBA, 2016b). For this study,
the SBA link demands explanation as to why the data is incomplete for the variables
shown in Equation 7. The immediate feature to be noticed from this SBA link is that it
contains archival data on small business loans extended to small businesses not only in
Florida but the entire United States and its territories. Second, small business loans fall
into two broad categories—the SBA 7(a) program and the SBA 504 small business loan
programs. Even though SBA 7(a) and SBA 504 are related, these are different small
business loan business programs.
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval
Conditional to the dissertation committee approval of this dissertation proposal,
the proposal was submitted to Walden University’s IRB and approved with an
identification authorization number (Walden IRB approval no. 03-20-17-0194918).
Following this process adhered the study to Walden University’s guidelines and rules.
SBA 7(a) Program
This study focused on the SBA 7(a) program because it is said to be “the SBA’s
primary program for helping start-up and existing small businesses with financing
guaranteed for a variety of general business purposes” (SBA, 2016a). Hence, because
SBA 7(a) is the primary program for small business loan guarantee programs, this study
focused solely on it. Table 5 presents variables and definitions of the SBA 7(a) program
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relevant to this study.
Table 5
SBA 7(a) Variables and Definitions
Field name

Definition
Indicator of whether the loan was approved under SBA's
Program
7(a) or 504 loan program
BorrName
Borrower name
BorrStreet
Borrower street address
BorrCity
Borrower city
BorrState
Borrower state
BorrZip
Borrower zip code
ThirdPartyLender_Name
Name of third party lender
ThirdPartyLender_City
Third party lender city
ThirdPartyLender_State
Third party lender state
ThirdPartyDollars
Third party loan amount
GrossApproval
SBA loan amount
ApprovalDate
Date the loan was approved
ApprovalFiscalYear
Fiscal year the loan was approved
ProjectCounty
County where project occurs
ProjectState
State where project occurs
Note. Adapted from “SBA 7(a) & 504 loan data reports,” by Small Business
Administration [SBA], 2016.
It is noteworthy to underscore that the variables in Table 5, and hence the data in
SBA 7(a), did not include all the variables in Equation 7. This incompleteness of
variables and data from SBA 7(a) demanded that those missing variables be sampled
elsewhere. For this reason, Table 6 presents the study variables and the sources where
they are to be sampled.
Table 6
Data Sources of the Study Variables
Study variables
(1) Credit rationing (CR)

Data sources
The bank that gave the loan
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Credit extended/credit requested

Balance sheet of the bank that gave the loan

(2) Loan guarantee scheme (LGS)

Balance sheet of the bank that gave the loan
and/or
the SBA 7(a) program

Yes or no
(3) Collateral (COLL)

Balance sheet of the bank that gave the loan

Yes or no
(4) Leverage (LEV)
Balance sheet of the bank that gave the loan
Total debt/total equity

It is noteworthy that these variables and data absent in SBA 7(a) are from microfirm level balance sheet entries, obtainable only from the small businesses directly or
from the applications for loans submitted to the lender banks, as was done in recent peerreviewed research on small business credit rationing (Kirschenmann, 2016). Therefore,
the present study proposed to follow the sampling procedure detailed from
Kirschenmann.
Firm-Level Balance Sheet Data and Variable Measurements
The data sources from Table 6 strongly indicated that it appeared prudent to use
the SBA 7(a) program link to identify the banks that gave loans to the small business
recipients. Second, with the lender banks’ contact information at hand, then approach the
banks for the balance sheet information given to them when loan applications were made
with them, an approach that has precedent in Kirschenmann (2016).
Additionally, as can be seen in Table 6, the operationalization of the dependent,
independent, and control variables for the present study required data from firm-level

69
balance sheet entries of the small businesses kept by the bankers. Again, this information
is absent in the SBA 7(a) publicly available databases but are available in the small
business balance sheets kept by the lender banks, as observed by Kirschenmann (2016).
Discussing this, Kirschenmann stated in her panel data study:
The data set used in this study comprises all of the small annuity loans,
credit lines, and overdrafts with amounts up to 50,000 euros extended
to firms by one Bulgarian bank (henceforth called the “Bank”) between
April 2003 and September 2007. The Bank is a nationwide commercial, fullservice bank that focuses on lending to micro, small and medium firms. (p. 71).
Summary of Kirschenmann (2016)
It does appear that a summary of Kirschenmann (2016) informs the present study,
as the present study followed Kirschenmann. Kirschenmann’s unique data set use of
matched loan applications and contracts to investigate loan rationing on small firms by
banks in Finland informed the present study. Her research objective was to empirically
investigate the extent (magnitude) of small firm loan rationing in their relationship with
those banks. The magnitude of loan rationing was functionally specified as the
relationship between the requested loan amounts of small firms compared to the loan
amount granted by the bank to the firm. The difference between these two quantities—
namely, requested and granted—was the index for loan rationing. As in the present study,
the ratio of the granted (G) and the requested (R) was a measure of the dependent
variable (loan rationing). This ratio (G/R) would then be expressed as a percent or
proportion so that it can be linearly related to the right-hand-side independent variable(s)
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and control variables. This specification is the same as in the present study, even though
the variables of interest may differ.
To sum up the sampling strategy for the present study, two-step procedures were
followed. In the first step, small business lender banks were identified from loan data
reports from the SBA (SBA, 2016b). In the second step, a random sample of about 300
credit-rationed small businesses in Florida from 2015 was drawn from the population of
credit-rationed small businesses in the archives of these lender banks. Due to the inability
to determine the sampling frame for the sample population of small businesses in Florida,
a robust sample size of about 300 was considered proportionate to a population of 1,072
reflecting the small businesses who were credit constrained in 2015. The G*Power
sample size software program enhanced in the study served as a guide to achieving the
appropriate robust sample for the research (Faul et al., 2009). The population and the
sample comprised of micro-level balance data submitted to the lender bank when the
small businesses submitted their loan applications to the lender banks.
Consequently, from this population, about 300 randomly drawn, credit-rationed
small businesses should have data on the following variables for this study:
(1) Credit rationing (CR): measured by credit extended/credit requested
(2) Loan guarantee scheme (LGS): binary measure (yes or no)
(3) Collateral (COLL): binary measure (yes or no)
(4) Leverage (LEV): total debt/total equity
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Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
As shown in Figure 2, the present study involves a dependent variable (CR), an
independent variable (LGS), and two control variables (COLL and LEV).

Independent variable
Loan guarantee
scheme

Dependent variable
Credit rationing

Control variables
Collateral & leverage

Figure 2. Influence of LGS on CR, controlling for COLL and LEV.
The model in Figure 2 is based on the theory of CR proposed by Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981). Each variable is operationalized in the following subsections.
Dependent Variable Operationalization
According to the CR theory of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), a typical small business
owner is credit rationed if the amount of loan that he or she applied for is less than the
amount of loan that he or she received from the bank. Much of the empirical literature on
CR has used this operationalization of CR (e.g., Drakos & Giannakopoulos, 2011; Ferri
& Murro, 2015; Mason, 2013; Park & Coleman, 2009). Therefore, following these
researchers, this study operationalizes CR as a ratio of the amount of credit extended
(received) by the small business divided by the amount of credit requested by the small
business (as shown in Equation 7). Therefore, it is critical to underscore one important
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key element of this ratio expressed in Equation 7—the lower the ratio, the higher its CR
(and vice versa). On this note, recent research on small business credit rationing
characterized this ratio as “an inverse measure of credit rationing with smaller values
indicating tighter rationing (Kirschenmann, 2016, p. 74). Thus, the nature of this ratio
guided the understanding of how the independent variable and the control variables
should influence the dependent variable (CR) as a ratio.
Specifically, operationalization of this CR ratio required the extraction of data on
the numerator and the denominator of this ratio. The data for the numerator and
denominator of this CR ratio were extracted from the data sources discussed under the
“Sampling and Sampling Procedure” subsection of this study.
Independent Variable Operationalization
As shown in Figure 2, the independent variable of this study was LGS.
Importantly, LGS is a binary variable whereby the small business either receives or does
not receive LGS. Therefore, LGS was operationalized as a 1/0 binary variable. The data
for this binary LGS participation were extracted from the data sources discussed under
the “Sampling and Sampling Procedure” subsection of this study.
Operationalization of Control Variable, COLL
As shown in Figure 2, a small business faces a choice to either use or not use
COLL to secure a loan. Therefore, COLL is a binary variable such that the small business
uses or does not use collateral. Therefore, COLL was operationalized as a 1/0 binary
variable. The data for this use or non-use of COLL were extracted from the data sources
discussed under the “Sampling and Sampling Procedure” subsection of this study.
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Operationalization of Control Variable, LEV
As shown in Figure 2, LEV is operationalized as a ratio of debt to equity for small
businesses. Therefore, it is critically important to stress that, for this study, the higher this
ratio, the greater the LEV and vice versa. This way, the expected influence of LEV on the
dependent variable is clearer to understand and interpret. Finally, this operationalization
of this LEV ratio required the extraction of data on the numerator (debt) and denominator
(equity). Hence, the data for the numerator and denominator of this LEV ratio were
extracted from the data sources discussed under the “Sampling and Sampling Procedure”
subsection of this study.
Data Analysis and Plan
Data analyses were done using the SPSS statistical software program. Beginning
with data cleaning to ensure that all cells in the SPSS spreadsheet contained the correct
inputs, only then were descriptive statistics computed. Specifically, measures of central
tendency (mean, median, etc.) were computed and reported as numbered tables for the
small businesses in this study. Following this, the focus shifted to the research question as
well as the null and the alternative hypotheses.
Multiple Regression Analysis Assumptions
All forms of multiple regressions hinge on one common fundamental assumption
of normality. This must be checked to ensure that this critical assumption is met to justify
the use of all parametric statistical tests. This is so because parametric tests rest on the
existence of the normal curve in distributions of the variables in the population from
where the sample was drawn. Theory and empirical perspectives suggest that tests of
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multiple regression assumptions should begin when data entry into the SPSS spreadsheets
(or whatever the statistical software and spreadsheet) are in focus.
Since hierarchical multiple regression analysis (HMRA) was the statistical
technique used for this study, the assumptions of outliers and normality of residuals
underlying this technique were evaluated accordingly.
The study was checked on whether there were influential outliers present in the
variables for this study. Surely, outliers are extreme values of variables operationalized in
the study. These extreme values distort expected values of the sample central tendency in
the study (Field, 2013). For this reason, outliers must be checked. Sometimes, these
outliers occur because of reckless data entry into the spreadsheets of the statistical
software program being used. (For example, the number 11 is typed when the intent is to
type number 1, or vice versa.) Data entry must be checked for the existence of outliers.
When outliers are revealed, they must be correctly coded before any tests are conducted
to check for normality. When outliers are corrected, then a retest for normality is done.
If normality is not met after the outliers are corrected, then various forms of
transformations exist to “force” the data to conform to the normality assumptions, (e.g.,
model builders may force the distribution to be normal, even though the distribution is
not normal in the real world). As stated by Box (1976):
…Equally, the statistician knows, for example, that in nature there never was a
normal distribution, there never was a straight line, yet with normal and linear
assumptions, known to be force, he can often derive results which match, to a
useful approximation, those found in the real world… (p. 792)
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The literature has full discussions of these issues, especially as they relate to the
importance of the difference between statistical significance and practical significance, as
well as their implications to large samples and p-values in empirical research (Lin et al.,
2013).
As established in the literature, only the observed residual (not the unobserved
errors) was checked to assure that it is normally distributed (Field, 2013; Francis, 2013).
Evidently, however, normality of the observed residuals was evaluated. In SPSS,
normality of residuals was assessed using a histogram and p-p plot of standardized
residuals plots (Field, 2013; Francis, 2013).
Using the “Explore” subcommand from the “Descriptive Statistics” command in
SPSS, the following procedures were conducted to examine the histograms for each
variable: Analyze > Descriptive > Explore > Statistics > Check Outlier Box > Continue >
Plot > Descriptive > Histogram.
The “Histogram” subcommand informs the degree to which each variable in the
study deviates from a normal distribution in the important sense of being negatively or
positively skewed. First, if the variable in question is negatively skewed, then a reflection
procedure is done to reverse (reflect) the negatively skewed values to become positively
skewed. Second, once the variable in question is now positively skewed, any form of
transformation can then be performed on the variable to “force” it to be normally
distributed.
Technically, the mathematics of reflection can be achieved in SPSS. First, using
the “Frequencies” subcommand in the “Descriptive Statistics” menu, locate the largest
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value on the variable of interest (e.g., say 15). The largest value should be negative as to
contribute to the negative skew in question. Second, convert to positive if it is negative so
that the absolute value becomes 15. Third, add positive 1 to it (16 in this example).
Finally, subtract all the values of the data points from that variable from 16. The result is
reflected as a positively skewed distribution for that variable. Any form of the appropriate
transformations may now be applied to transform that variable to be normally distributed.
The type of transformation to be applied to the data is dependent on the degree of
excessive skew. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggested various forms of
transformations suitable to levels of skew or non-normality in a particular data set (Table
7).
Table 7
Data Distributions and Likely Transformations
Moderate positive skew
Substantially positive skew

Square root transformation
Logarithmic (log 10) transformation

Substantially positive skew
(with zero values)

Logarithmic (log 10) transformation
(add a constant to log 10); log 10 (x + c)

Moderate negative skew

Square root transformation

Substantially negative skew

Logarithmic (log 10) transformation

For this study, various separate figures were produced to report the SPSS results
of these tests when the procedure is conducted on the archival data.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
For the study, the following three research questions and hypotheses were
investigated.
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Research Question 1
RQ1: Is there any relationship (influence) of LGS on CR, controlling for COLL
and LEV?
Null Hypothesis 1
H01: There is no relationship (influence) of LGS on CR, controlling for COLL
and LEV.
Alternative Hypothesis 1
H1: There is a relationship (influence) of LGS on CR, controlling for COLL and
LEV.
Research Question 2
RQ2: Is there any relationship (influence) of COLL on CR?
Null Hypothesis 2
H02: There is no relationship (influence) of COLL on CR.
Alternative Hypothesis 2
H2: There is a relationship (influence) of COLL on CR.
Research Question 3
RQ3: Is there any relationship (influence) of LEV on CR?
Null Hypothesis 3
H03: There is no relationship (influence) of LEV on CR.
Alternative Hypothesis 3
H3: There is a relationship (influence) of LEV on CR.
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Criteria for the Rejection or Acceptance of Null and Alternative Hypotheses
It is important to note, going forward, that Equations 1, 3, and 5 are selfexplanatory partial derivatives of the numerator with respect to the denominator set equal
to zero. In other words, the relationship between the dependent variable (the numerator)
and the independent variable (the denominator) was zero, and that was in line with the
concept of null hypothesis introduced decades ago (Fisher, 1956).
Hypothesis 1
The following criteria were used to reject or accept the null hypothesis, H01, and
alternative hypothesis, H1. Keeping in mind that a linear relationship is assumed between
the dependent variable (CR) and all the other variables in the study (LGS, COLL, LEV),
H01 was rejected if the following pattern of partial derivatives between CR and LGS
holds:

∂CR
∂LGS

=0

(8)

Furthermore, H1 was accepted if the following pattern of partial derivatives
between CR and LGS holds:

∂CR
∂LGS

>0

(9)

Hypothesis 2
The following criteria were used to reject or accept the null hypothesis, H02, and
alternative hypothesis, H2. Again, keeping in mind that a linear relationship is assumed
between the dependent variable (CR) and all the other variables in the study (LGS,
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COLL, LEV), H02 was rejected if the following pattern of partial derivative exists
between CR and COLL:

∂CR
∂COLL

=0

(10)

Similarly, H2 was accepted if the following pattern of partial derivative was found
between CR and COLL:

∂CR
∂COLL

>0

(11)

Hypothesis 3
The following criteria were used to reject or accept the null hypothesis, H03, and
alternative hypothesis, H3. Again, keeping in mind that a linear relationship is assumed
between the dependent variable (CR) and all the other variables in the study (LGS,
COLL, LEV), H03 was rejected if the following pattern of partial derivative exists
between CR and LEV:

∂CR
∂LEV

=0

(12)

In the same manner, H3 was accepted if the following pattern of partial derivative
was found between CR and LEV:

∂CR
∂LEV

>0

(13)
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Statistical Tests for Hypotheses
To enhance the readability of this chapter, Equation 7 (renumbered to Equation
14) is reproduced here so that there is a sharper focus on how the statistical tests were
performed, as well as an explanation of each term. Hence, Equation 14:

CR = β0 + β1 LGS + β2 COLL + β3 LEV + ε

(14)

Where,
CR: Credit rationing (dependent variable) was measured by the amount of credit
extended to the small business divided by the amount of credit requested by the small
business. This is a ratio where the numerator is credit extended and the denominator is
credit requested. Focusing on this ratio, the lower the ratio, the higher the CR and vice
versa. Interestingly, recent research on small business credit rationing (Kirschenmann,
2016) characterized this ratio as “an inverse measure of credit rationing with smaller
values indicating tighter rationing (p. 74). Hence, the nature of this ratio informed
understanding of how the independent variable and the control variables should influence
the dependent variable (CR) as a ratio.
LGS: A dummy variable indicating the participation of the small business in an
LGS. The operationalization of this variable entails a straightforward choice of either
participation or no participation. Specifically, 1 represents “participated” and 0 “not
participated.” Theory and empirical settings suggest that LGS should be related to CR,
according to Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981) seminal theory of CR.
COLL: A dummy variable indicating whether the loan was collateralized or not.
Thus, COLL was operationalized as 1 representing “collateralized” and 0 “not
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collateralized.” Under the signaling theory, collateral serves as a signaling mechanism for
loan quality and as strong credit protection, even in a case where a loan may not have
been approved at all.
With respect to the potential effect of COLL on CR, the picture is unclear because
economists have documented instances where COLL involves risk rather than mitigating
it (Helberg & Lindset, 2016). This makes the expected effect of the COLL term on CR to
be uncertain and dependent on samples used.
LEV: LEV was measured by the ratio of its debt to equity. The debt to equity ratio
is a term that computes the capital structure of a firm in the sense that there is an inverse
relationship between the debt of a firm and its equity. The higher the debt, the lower the
equity and vice versa. Because of this relationship, the debt-equity ratio paints a picture
of the different sources of funds a firm uses to finance its operation.
With respect to the expected effect of debt-equity ratio or LEV to CR, the
financial economic literature is unclear about the expected impact of LEV on CR. There
is no optimal level of debt-equity ratio (Davydov, 2016). The controversy on whether an
optimal level of debt-equity ratio exists is beyond the purpose of this study.
ε: The error (also called noise, disturbance term, or perturbation) refers to the
theoretical and, hence, non-observable stochastic (random) events that account for the
differences between the observed values of the dependent variable and its theoretical
value for any given model. In that model, the error term and its theoretical values cannot
be computed because both are among the unknown, unobservable population parameters.
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As is the case in Equation 14, what statisticians do, though, is to find the best
estimators of the model parameters using sample data from an unknown population. In
the sample data, there must be a difference between the observed values and those
estimated by the model—this difference is called the residuals. Thus, there is an inverse
relationship between the value of the residual and true values of the estimated unknown
population parameters. The larger the residual, the more the chances that the sample
estimators fail to capture the true but unknown population parameters; this could be for
many reasons, including, but not limited to, omitted variables in Equation 14.
Hypothesis 1 involves a statistical test of the null hypothesis in that there is no
relationship (influence) between LGS and CR, controlling for COLL and LEV. Here,
attention must focus on the population parameter labeled. It follows that if the slope
(coefficient) on that sample estimate is large enough to be statistically significant at the
5% level or less, then the null hypothesis is not upheld and the alternative hypothesis is
instead upheld.
Finally, in testing Hypothesis 1, the control variables were first entered in the
estimation process. Entering the control variables (COLL and LEV) first in the statistical
estimation process ensured that their effects on the variance of the dependent variable
(CR) are statistically purged out. This way, the influence on the dependent variable is
purged out prior to estimating the effect of the independent variable on the dependent
variable (Field, 2013). However, the coefficients of the control variables, as well as their
statistical significances, are presented in Chapter 4.
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Hypothesis 2 tests the null hypothesis in that there is no relationship (influence)
between COLL and CR. In the framework of Equation 14, this statistical test hinges on
the statistical significance (or not) of the sample estimate of β2 in Equation 14.
Specifically, if β2 is statistically significant at conventional levels (≤ 0.05), then the null
hypothesis—COLL has no influence on CR—is not upheld and the alternative hypothesis
is instead upheld. By supporting the alternative hypothesis, it implies that COLL has
influence on CR.
Hypothesis 3 calls for a test of the null hypothesis in that there is no relationship
(influence) between LEV and CR. This statistical test revolves around the statistical
significance (or otherwise) of the sample estimate of β3 on the framework of Equation 14.
Specifically, if β3 is statistically significant at conventional levels (≤ 0.05), then the null
hypothesis—LEV has no influence on CR—is not upheld and the alternative hypothesis
is instead upheld. By upholding the alternative hypothesis, empirical evidence would
exist suggesting that LEV has influence on CR.
Finally, the preceding discussions are the criteria to be met for retaining or not
retaining the null hypotheses for this study.
Threats to Validity
External Validity
With respect to the external validity of the study, special attention is paid to the
potential problems of sample selection bias as a major threat to external validity.
Specifically, sample selection bias occurs when the sample being studied does not
represent the population that the researcher wants to make generalizations
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(extrapolations) off. To be exact, if selection bias occurs, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to argue that the results of the study can be generalized to the wider population from
where the sample was drawn (Babbie, 2010; Bagozzi, 1980; Bagozzi et al., 1991).
This study guided against sample selection bias by making sure that the sample
was drawn from a random sample of small business firms that were credit rationed in
Florida, using the sampling procedure discussed in this chapter.
Internal Validity
The empirical literature is clear that the concept of internal validity is relevant
only to studies premised to investigate cause-and-effect relationships (Churchill, 1979;
O’Leary-Kelly & Vokurka, 1998). Because the present study was not concerned with
cause-and-effect relationships, internal validity was not relevant to this study. To
reiterate, the present study aimed to investigate the following three questions: (a) How
much of the variation in the dependent variable (CR) can be explained by the independent
variable (LGS), controlling for the influence of COLL and LEV; (b) Is the relationship
between COLL and CR zero; and (c) Is the relationship between LEV and CR zero?
Construct Validity
Construct validity has been defined as an attempting at “representing the
correspondence between a construct (conceptual definition of a variable) and the
operational procedure to measure or manipulate that construct” (Schwab, 1980, p. 5).
By this definition, construct validity indices are many and depend on which apply to the
study at hand. However, this study was based only on archival data. As such, no
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instrument was developed or borrowed to operationalize any construct. Hence, construct
validation is beyond the objective of this study to be premised on archival databases.
Ethical Procedures
Ethical consideration in research is a critical issue involving data collection in
natural settings where human participation may raise ethical issues related to human
subjects in research (Manita et al., 2011). However, in the present study, there were no
data collection issues regarding personal human subjects. That said, this study adhered to
every ethical standard stipulated by Walden University. For example, in gathering
archival data for this study, the legal names and identities of the small businesses and
their owners were not disclosed to any third party to guide against legal ramifications.
There was strict confidentiality and anonymity of the data extracted from the archival
databases.
Summary
To summarize, this study was a response to suggestions to fill research gaps in the
current literature on CR. Specifically, this study was premised to quantitatively
investigate the question: How much of the variation in the dependent variable (CR) can
be explained by the independent variable (LGS), controlling for the influence of COLL
and LEV?
To attain this purpose, the study used archival data on small businesses in Florida
that were credit rationed in 2015. The major sections of this chapter included the research
design, the rationale in support of the design, the research methodology, population,
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sampling frame, and the procedure to extract the archival data to be used for data
analysis.
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Chapter 4: Data Collection and Results
Introduction
The purpose of this archival data, regression-based study was to quantitatively test
the influence of loan guarantee scheme (LGS) on credit rationing (CR). In pursuit of this
purpose, the archival data set for this empirical investigation was drawn from small
businesses that have been credit rationed in Florida in 2015. Furthermore, the Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) seminal theory of CR was used as the theoretical platform for the study.
With the theory dubbed as “the workhorse Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing”
(Agur, 2012, p. 220), there are scholarly supports to use Stiglitz-Weiss theory of credit
rationing for the present study (Agur, 2012; Mason, 2014).
According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), lenders (typically banks) fail to extend
the full amount of credit that would reflect the correct assessment of information
available at the time the credit contract was consummated. In other words, CR occurs
when banks deny a loan to borrowers who have the same characteristics as those that
receive the loan. In this sense, a small business loan borrower is said to be credit rationed
if the demand for a loan is greater than the amount of a loan the small business received
from the bank. Thus, the gap between the amount of loan requested and received by the
small business borrower is typically operationalized as CR (Drakos & Giannakopoulos,
2011; Mason, 2014; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).
With this operationalization in mind, this chapter is organized as follows.
Following the introduction to the chapter, research questions and hypotheses are defined.
Data collection strategies for the study are then presented. Following this, study results
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are examined in line with the research questions and hypotheses. Next, the assumptions
underlining the use of all types of multiple regression analysis are discussed. Finally, a
summary concludes the chapter.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The hypotheses for Research Questions 1, 2, and 3 and their acceptance/rejection
criteria were fully discussed in proposition terms in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, these
hypotheses and their acceptance/rejection criteria are presented in terms denoting that
statistical estimations have been performed.
For the present study, the following three research questions and hypotheses were
investigated.
Research Question 1
RQ1: Is there any relationship (influence) of loan guarantee scheme (LGS) on
credit rationing (CR)?
Null Hypothesis 1
H01: There is no relationship (influence) of LGS on CR.
The criteria used to reject or accept this null hypothesis were as follows. Keeping
in mind that a linear relationship was assumed between the dependent variable (CR) and
all the other variables in the study (LGS, COLL, and LEV), then, where the pattern of
partial derivatives (shown below) existed between CR and LGS, the null hypothesis
would have been rejected.

∂CR
∂LGS

=0

(15)
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Once the null hypothesis was rejected, then the alternative hypothesis (presented
below) was accepted.
Alternative Hypothesis 1
H1: There is a relationship (influence) of LGS on CR, controlling for COLL and
LEV.
Surely, once the pattern of partial derivatives (shown below) was found to exist
between CR and LGS, the alternative hypothesis would have been accepted:

∂CR
∂LGS

>0

(16)

Research Question 2
RQ2: Is there any relationship (influence) of collateral (COLL) on credit rationing
(CR)?
Null Hypothesis 2
H02: There is no relationship (influence) of COLL on CR.
Thus, the acceptance/rejection of this null hypothesis was that, where the
relationship between CR and COLL followed the pattern of partial derivatives (shown
below), this null hypothesis would have been rejected:

∂CR
∂COLL

=0

Understandably, once the null hypothesis was rejected, then the alternative
hypothesis was accepted.

(17)
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Alternative Hypothesis 2
H2: There is a relationship (influence) of COLL on CR.
Once the pattern of partial derivatives (shown below) was found to exist between
CR and COLL, this alternative hypothesis would have been accepted:

∂CR
∂COLL

>0

(18)

Research Question 3
RQ3: Is there any relationship (influence) of leverage (LEV) on credit rationing
(CR)?
Null Hypothesis 3
H03: There is no relationship (influence) of LEV on CR. Accordingly, the
acceptance/rejection of this null hypothesis was that, where the relationship between LEV
and CR followed the pattern of partial derivatives (shown below), this null hypothesis
would have been rejected:

∂CR
∂LEV

=0

(19)

Alternative Hypothesis 3
H3: There is a relationship (influence) of LEV on CR. Clearly, once the pattern of
partial derivatives (shown below) was found to exist between LEV and CR, this
alternative hypothesis would have been accepted:

∂CR
∂LEV

>0

(20)
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Data Collection
The following sequential steps were used to gather the archival data for the
present study. The first step was ensuring that IRB approval was obtained for this
dissertation. In the second step, I followed a sampling procedure discussed in a recent
peer-reviewed article by Kirschenmann (2016) that focused on small businesses that were
credit rationed. In line with Kirschenmann’s article, a search was conducted using
archival data to identify the sampling frame for small businesses that were credit rationed
in Florida in 2015. This effort resulted in the identification of two sampling frames: (1)
The National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) by the Federal Reserve Bank
(the FED) and (2) the Small Business Administration (SBA) databases.
The National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF)
It is public knowledge that the FED conducts its NSSBF every interval of five
years (Mills & McCarthy, 2014; Park & Coleman, 2009). Of American’s 2.7 million
small businesses, smallest firms were hit harder than large firms with regards to the
employees affected during the financial crisis. The disparity of small firms employees’
job decline was 14.1 percent in the employment fewer than 50 employees, compared to
9.5 percent in establishment with 50 to 500 employees (Mills & McCarthy, 2014).
Additionally, in using this database, Park and Coleman (2009) identified in their
comment that the NSSBF “ is the largest and most comprehensive data set of its type
representing a national sample of firms stratified by geographic region, industry sector,
gender and race” (p. 257–8).
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Likewise, Mills and McCarthy (2014) recently commented on the richness of
information in the NSSBF database, declaring that “one of the best pictures we have of
sources and uses of credit by small businesses is the Federal Reserve’s National Survey
of Small Business Finances, which, while dated as of 2003, indicates that about 60
percent of small businesses use term loans to finance their operations” (p. 18). Evidently,
“the best pictures” in the NSSBF database relate to the following data on firm
characteristics, including, but not limited to, firm size, firm age, profitability,
metropolitan statistical area (MSA), industry type, sales, assets, and more (Park &
Coleman, 2009). Overall, the NSSBF databases appear to have the information on the
variables to be operationalized for this study. However, in the highly unlikely event that
the variables of the present study are not available in the NSSBF databases, the same data
pertinent to the present study were then extracted from the SBA databases. Surely, in
designing the present study, months of literature and database searches revealed that
NSSBF and SBA databases store archival data pertinent to the present study, as
confirmed by other scholars (e.g., Mills & McCarthy, 2014; Park & Coleman, 2009).
The Small Business Administration (SBA) Databases
Many SBA databases have rich firm-level pieces of information that are relevant
to the purpose of the present study. The SBA does not directly give loans to small
businesses but guarantees the loans given to small businesses by lenders. For example,
the SBA has a database for the 7(a) programs. This database has the following data
relevant to the present study: (1) the name of the small business getting the loan, (2) the
physical address of the small business getting the loan, (3) the bank lending the money,
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(4) the amount loaned, (5) the interest rate paid as cost of capital, and other data for the
present study. With a fee, these data are available at many places such as
www.whodoessbaloans.com. Beyond this source, SBA officers are willing to assist
students who need help with data for purely academic purposes. For example, the office
of Mr. Miguel Gonzalez [(305) 536-5521, ext. 141] at Miami, Florida gives assistance to
students who may need such data.
Furthermore, the South Florida Small Business Resource Guide (the Guide)
contains information on active SBA lenders to small businesses, including rich
information on loans applied for and loans received by small businesses in Florida. In
addition, and most importantly, the SBA’s 7(a) program provides loans to small business
owners unable to obtain loans to finance their businesses through the traditional sources
of financing. The 7(a) program operates through private sector lenders who provide the
loans to needy small business owners so that the SBA guarantees these loans. This
program has rich information pertaining to data on the following: (1) the business getting
the loan, (2) address of the business, (3) industry codes of the bank lending the money,
(4) the amount applied, (5) the amount received, (6) the interest rate paid, and so on. The
data in this source spanned from the 1950s to September 2016.
Consequently, following Kirschenmann (2016), a search revealed that the
following SBA database link (https://www.sba.gov/content/sba-7a-504-loan-datareports) contained data on small business lender banks which, in turn, possessed the
firm-level balance sheet information adequate for the purposes of the present study.
Notably, a full discussion of this SBA link and why it was deemed relevant to the
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dissertation were presented in Chapter 3.
Briefly, this SBA link served three purposes. First, it explicitly indicated that the
SBA 7(a) program is the best and most popular SBA small business program capable of
providing the sampling frame for the data requirements of the present dissertation.
Second (and related to the first reason), this link afforded detailed data on small business
lender banks in Florida in 2015. Third and finally, I established contact with these lender
bankers and explained the purpose of the study to them, as was done in (Kirschenman,
2016).
Specifically, these lender banks were asked to assist me with their databases
containing information on small business loan applications submitted to their banks, so
that I would extract the necessary balance sheet data necessary for this dissertation
(compare to Kirschenman, 2016). I explained to them that I am an American citizen
doing a doctoral dissertation in finance. Almost all of these requests were denied because
these lender banks were fearful of the legal implications of releasing customer
information to a third party.
After lengthy discussions, whereby similar academic studies on small business
credit rationing were sent to these lender banks, two lender banks agreed to release the
data but conditional to the following binding anonymity stipulations. First, the data
should be used only for academic dissertation purposes, not for commercial use at all.
Second, under no circumstances should the name of the bank and the data set be released
to any party other than the student conducting the study, for fear of data leakages. Third,
the names of the small businesses should not be mentioned in the study—only statistical
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numbers should be used to identify each small business in the sample. Fourth, a violation
of any or all of these anonymity conditions breaches the bank’s social ties with the person
who assisted me to convince the bankers to release the data to me. Finally, of these two
lender banks, one bank appeared to have a larger database from where the balance sheet
data sets for this dissertation were collected. Therefore, following Kirschenmann (2016,
p. 71), this lender bank henceforth is called “the bank.”
Sample Selection Criteria
The criteria for including specific small business firms into the study sample were
the firm must have complete information for 2015 on the following variables:
(1) Credit rationing (CR): measured by credit extended/credit requested
(2) Loan guarantee scheme (LGS): a binary variable, yes or no
(3) Collateral (COLL): a binary variable, yes or no
(4) Leverage (LEV): measured by total debt/total equity
By these criteria, the database had 1,072 small business firms in Florida for 2015.
To ensure a robust sample was drawn from this population, sample size
computation was performed using G*Power software 4.0 (Faul et al., 2009). Thus,
sample size calculation is shown in Table 8:
Table 8
Sample Size Computation Results Using G*Power 4.0
F-test—linear multiple regression: fixed model, R2
Analysis: a priori, compute required sample size
Input parameters
Output parameters
Effect size
0.08 Non-centrality parameter
A err prob.
0.05 Critical F
Power (1 – err prob.)
0.95 Numerator df

17.5200000
2.2829
3
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Number of tested predictors
Total number of predictors

3
3

Denominator df
Total sample size
Actual power

215
219
0.9504025

As seen in Table 8, the left-hand side (LHS) pieces of information inputted into
G*Power yielded the calculated data on the right-hand side (RHS). In summary, as seen
on the RHS, the total sample size required is 219 with an actual power of 0.9504025.
Clearly, a robust sample size of 240 for this study is far greater than the sample size of
219 suggested by G*Power’s sample computation.
Study Results
Descriptive Statistics
As discussed in Chapter 3, the data collection techniques used in the present study
followed techniques used in a recent empirical study on small business CR. As can be
observed in Table 9, the descriptive statistics of the study variables have been presented
to include the entire range of all variables in the study: the dependent variable (CR), the
independent variable (LGS), and the two control variables (COLL and LEV). Because the
operationalization or the measurement strategy of each variable in the study is presented
in Table 9, future researchers may reconstruct the entire data set of the study, as stated in
the University’s doctoral research students’ guidelines. For example, COLL and LEV
were measured as binary variables whereby the minimum and maximum values equal 0
and 1, respectively. Conversely, the dependent variable (CR) should be methodologically
operationalized as an interval or ratio variable so that it be used for multiple regression
analysis. Therefore, CR was measured as the ratio of the granted loan amount to the
requested loan amount. This measurement strategy follows Kirschenmann (2016).
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Table 9
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Variable
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. deviation
CR
240
34.00
65.00
47.99
8.25
LGS
240
0.00
1.00
0.400
0.49
COLL
240
0.00
1.00
0.266
0.44
LEV
240
1.47
5.18
3.41
0.96
Note. CR = credit rationing; LGS = loan guarantee scheme; COLL= loan collateral; LEV
= loan leverage.
Research Questions and Results
Research Question 1 and Hypothesis 1
Research Question 1 was about the relationship (influence) of LGS on CR.
Research Question 1 and Hypothesis 1 were examined in the framework of Equation 14
(renumbered to Equation 21). To enhance the readability of this chapter, Equation 21 is
repositioned below, allowing a sharper focus on how the statistical tests were performed
as well as explanations of each term in the equation. Hence, Equation 21:

CR = β0 + β1 LGS + β2 COLL + β3 LEV + ε

(21)

Where,
CR = Credit rationing
LGS = Loan guarantee scheme
COLL = Loan collateral
LEV = Loan leverage
ɛ = Error term
A two-step sequential hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed to
answer Research Question 1 and test Hypothesis 1 in the framework of the SPSS
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statistical software program. Understandably, the two-step analysis involved two models,
Model 1 and Model 2 (as shown in Tables 10–12). Additionally, Model 1 and Model 2
are similarly dubbed in the literature as “block 1 and block 2,” respectively (Fields, 2013;
Hayes, 2013). This clarification was necessary to obviate any confusion in statistical
jargons.
Importantly, it is noteworthy to underscore that Research Question 1 and
Hypothesis 1 are stated as conditional statements. In line with this conditional
requirement, it was inevitable that the influence of the control variables (COLL and LEV)
be controlled while simultaneously estimating the influence of the independent variable
(LGS) on the dependent variable (CR). For this reason, two separate but interlinked
models were needed (Field, 2013), which explains why the two models were conducted
in the estimation process for the present study. First, with the nature of the research
question in mind, the predictive effects of the independent variable (LGS) were estimated
along with the two control variables (COLL and LEV) being statistically controlled by
estimating their effects first.
Second, the standard manner in which SPSS performs this form of multiple
regression analysis has been variously called hierarchical multiple regression analysis
(HMRA) or sequential multiple regression analysis (SMRA). Either way, it entails
splitting the estimation process into two separate yet interrelated models (Field, 2013).
Empirical Findings for Research Question 1 and Hypothesis 1
The following sections report the estimated empirical findings with regard to each
of the research questions and related hypotheses.
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T-Statistics on LGS
In the framework of a two-step HMRA, empirical evidence (presented in Table
10) suggested strong evidence for Hypothesis 1. Specifically, this test focused attention
on the t ratio associated with the independent variable (LGS). In Table 10, the value of
the t statistics was highly statistically significant (p < .001), at the conventional levels of
empirical statistical tests.
Therefore, the null of Hypothesis 1 was rejected. Put differently, there was a
relationship (influence) between LGS (independent variable) on CR (dependent variable),
controlling for COLL and LEV as the control variables. To underscore this finding, it is
critical to emphasize that Research Question 1 and Hypothesis 1 is the key research
objective of the present study as it focused on whether or not LGS was a statistically
significant predictor of CR, contingent on controlling the two control variables, loan
COLL and LEV. Therefore, this particular empirical result was the crucial primary
finding of the present study. Next, complementary support for the empirical result, based
on the t statistics on the independent variable (LGS) as a statistically significant predictor
of the dependent variable (CR), was on R-square change statistics.
Table 10
Multiple Regression Results of Collateral, Leverage, and Loan Guarantee on Credit
Rationing

Model 1
Constant
COLL

Unstandardized
Coefficients
(B)

Standardized
Std.
error

Coefficients

51.9
2.2

1.94
1.2

.
0.1

Collinearity stat.
T

Sig. Tolerance

26.7 .000
1.8 .06

.96

VIF

1.0

100
LEV

.96

.58

.11

1.7

.96

.96

1.0

Model 2
Constant
52.6
1.6
.
32.7 .000
COLL
9.1
1.2
.48
7.5 .000
.67
1.4
LEV
.65
.48
.07
1.3 .17
.86
1.1
LGS
11.2
1.0
.67
10.4 .000
.67
1.4
Note. Dependent variable = CR; LGS = loan guarantee scheme; COLL = loan collateral;
LEV = loan leverage; VIF = variance inflation factor.
R-square Change Empirical Test of Research Question 1 and Hypothesis 1
ANOVA Table
There is complementary empirical evidence in support of the statistical
significance of the independent variable (LGS) as a statistically significant predictor of
the dependent variable (CR) in the ANOVA table (Table 11).
Table 11
ANOVA Table of Collateral, Leverage, and Loan Guarantee on Credit Rationing

Model 1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of squares
536.08
15746
16282.95

Df
2
237
239

Mean square
268.04
66.44

F
4.03

Significance
0.01

Model 2

Regression
5515.11
3
1838.37
40.29
0.00
Residual
10767.84
236
45.62
Total
16282.95
239
Note. Model 1: Dependent variable = credit rationing (CR); Predictors: leverage (LEV)
and collateral (COLL). Model 2: Dependent variable = credit rationing (CR); Predictors:
leverage (LEV), collateral (COLL), and loan guarantee scheme (LGS).
Thus, the information from the ANOVA table focused on investigating whether
the regression model embedded in the ANOVA table was better at predicting the
dependent variable (CR) than using the mean as a “best guess” for predicting the
dependent variable (CR) (compared to Field, 2013). To be more specific, the F-ratio was
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computed to compare the statistical improvement in the prediction of the dependent
variable by fitting the regression equation, against the prediction of the same dependent
variable, by using “noise” (labeled Residual) in the table (compared to Field, 2013).
The ANOVA framework was split into two parts. Because the improvement in
predicting the dependent variable using the ANOVA regression was far greater than the
noise (residuals) within the model, the value of the F-statistics was far greater than 2. As
such, SPSS computed the exact probability of obtaining such F-statistics solely by
chance. Keeping in mind that the initial model (Model 1) had only two control variables
(COLL and LEV), the F-ratio was 4.03, and this value was extremely unlikely to have
occurred by chance (p < 0.01). On the other hand, the addition of the independent
variable (LGS) in the second model (Model 2) yielded an F-ratio of 40.29. As can be
observed in Table 11, this final model significantly improved the prediction of CR (p <
0.001). This improvement was ascribed to the inclusion of the independent variable
(LGS) in the model. In conclusion, using empirical evidence from three slightly different
yet interrelated statistical procedures (HMRA, R-square change, and ANOVA), the
present study has demonstrated quantitative evidence suggesting that the independent
variable (LGS) was a statistically significant predictor of the dependent
variable (CR) for the present study. Research Question 2 and Hypothesis 2 are
presented next.
Research Question 2 and Hypothesis 2
The premise of Research Question 2 was if there was any relationship (influence)
of COLL on CR. Hypothesis 2 was examined by focusing attention on the t ratio
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associated with COLL. Because testing for the influence of COLL on CR entailed a
direct predictive effect test, the focus was on Table 10 Model 1. The t ratio associated
with COLL in Model 1 is not statistically significant (p > .05). Therefore, the null
hypothesis of Hypothesis 1 was accepted. Put differently, there was no relationship
(influence) of loan COLL on CR.
To avoid confusion, the information in models 1 and 2 in Table 10 need
clarification. Research Question 1 and Hypothesis 1 required empirical testing of the
direct effect (influence) of COLL on CR, focusing on the t ratio associated with COLL in
in Model 1, not Model 2, of Table 10. The reason is Model 2 involved a combination of
influence from other variables, which may mislead one to infer that COLL was
statistically significant. That is, the statistical significance on COLL in Model 2 was high
(p < 0.001). However, this high statistical significance was contributed by LEV and LGS.
Therefore, to isolate precisely the level of statistical significance attributable solely to
COLL, the focus should be on the t statistics of COLL in Model 1, where it was
insignificant at conventional levels (p > .05). Finally, the empirical evidence in Model 1
suggested that there was no relationship (influence) of loan COLL on CR. The results of
Research Question 3 and Hypothesis 3 are discussed next.
Research Question 3 and Hypothesis 3
The basis of Research Question 3 was if there was any relationship (influence) of
LEV on CR? Hypothesis 3 was examined by focusing attention on the t ratio associated
with LEV. Because testing for the influence of LEV on CR meant a direct test of the
predictive effect of LEV on CR, the focus was on Model 1 of Table 10. As can be clearly
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observed, the t ratio associated with LEV in Model 1 was not statistically significant (p >
.05). Therefore, the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 1 was accepted, and there was no
relationship (influence) of loan LEV on CR.
Overall, the primary substantive empirical investigation of this study concentrated
on the degree of variance in small business CR explained by LGS. Evidence from Table
12 strongly suggests that LGS explained 30.6% of the variance in CR, and this
contribution was highly statistically significant (p < 0.001).
The r-square change in Table 12 was highly statistically significant at
conventional levels (p < 0.001). Even though the empirical evidence in Table 12 is selfexplanatory (as the typical SPSS r-square change result), a breakdown is presented of the
findings to make things clearer and to avoid any confusion.
Table 12
SPSS Model Summary: Multiple Regression Results of Collateral, Leverage, and Loan
Guarantee on Credit Rationing

Model

R

R-square

Adjusted Rsquare

Std. error of
estimate

1
2

0.181
0.58

0.033
0.339

0.025
0.330

8.15
6.75

Change statistics
Model
1
2

R-square
change
0.033
0.306

Fchange
4.03
109.13

Df1

Df2

2
1

237
236

Sig. Fchange
0.019
0.000

Durbin–Watson = 2.010
Note. Dependent variable = credit rationing (CR); Model 1 predictor variables =
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constants— COLL and LEV; Model 2 predictor variables = constants—COLL, LEV, and
LGS.
On entering the two control variables of the study (COLL and LEV) in the SPSS
estimation process, the r-square change in Model 1 was 0.033. This r-square change was
statistically significant (p < 0.05). However, when the independent variable (LGS) of the
study was entered into the estimation process, the r-square change jumped from 0.033 to
0.306, and this 0.306 in r-square change was statistically significant (p < 0.00). That is,
even though the r-square change of 0.306 was solely attributed to the independent
variable (LGS), the significance level was reported under “Sig. F-Change” because the
other variables were still in the estimation process. This warranted the use of F-statistics
to inform that the contribution of LGS appearing over the r-square change was attributed
to the two control variables (COLL and LEV) in the models. In conclusion, these two
pieces of empirical evidence were of strong statistical support, indicating that LGS was a
predictor of CR. This result was an encouraging empirical finding of the study because it
appears to be the overall takeaway a reader of this study should have. A discussion of the
assumption of multiple regression analysis is presented next.
Assumptions of Multiple Regression Analysis
Influential Outliers
The data set was examined for the presence of any influential outliers. No
influential outliers were found among the values of the variables in the regression
analysis for the dependent variable (CR) and the independent variable (LGS), as well as
the two control variables (COLL and LEV).
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Normality of Residuals
It has been well documented in the literature that only the observed residual (not
the unobserved errors) should be examined to assure that it is normally distributed (Field,
2013; Francis, 2013). In line with this notion, I used SPSS to examine the extent of
normality of the residuals in the present study. Specifically, normality was evaluated in
the framework of a P-P plot of standardized residuals as well as a histogram (Francis,
2013; Field, 2013). These results are presented in Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 3.Normal P-P plot of regression standardized residual of the dependent variable
(CR).
Similarly, the histogram of the dependent variable (CR) is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Histogram of the dependent variable (CR).
It is encouraging to observe that the P-P plot and accompanying histogram appear
to suggest no serious departure from normality. That is, the degree of non-normality was
not serious enough to cast doubt on the regression coefficients shown, especially in the
multiple regression estimations. Second, because multiple regression is robust to a fairly
large sample size, as used in the present study, confidence in the results of the study is
enhanced (Lin et al., 2013). Furthermore, even though the slight violation of normality
was not considered serious enough to undermine the regression results, an attempt was
made to transform the data (Field, 2013). That is, log and square root transformations
commonly used in the literature (Francis, 2013) failed to radically improve the results of
the estimation. At this juncture, I was encouraged by George Box’s (1976) statement:
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…the statistician knows…that in nature there never was a normal distribution,
there never was a straight line, yet with normal and linear assumptions, known to
be false, he can often derive results which match, to a useful approximation, those
found in the real world. (pp. 791–9)
Multicollinearity
On checking for multicollinearity, the present study found evidence that
multicollinearity was absent as confirmed by (1) the examination of bivariate correlations
and scatterplots between each pair of the independent variables and (2) the SPSS output
on the variance inflation factor (VIF; shown in Table 10). Both the tolerance and VIF
tests were within the acceptable range (Field, 2005).
With respect to the acceptable range of VIF and tolerance, experts suggested that
if the largest VIF is greater than 10, this indicated that multicollinearity is a problem in
the study (Field, 2013). The largest VIF value in the study was 1.4 (Table 10). Similarly,
experts suggest that a tolerance below 0.1 indicates that there is a concern for
multicollinearity in the study (Field, 2013). In the present study, the tolerance is 0.71
corresponding to the reciprocal of the VIF of 1.4 (Field, 2013). Technically, the VIF for
the two models in Table 10 can be computed as follows:
VIF for Model 1

VIF = 1 / (1 – R2)

(22)

= 1 - 0.033
= 1.034
VIF for Model 2

VIF = 1 / (1 – R2)
= 1 - 0.339

(23)
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= 1.51
As can be seen, these two VIF statistics for Model 1 and Model 2 closely
approximate the VIF statistics reported in Table 10.
Homoscedasticity–Equality of Variance
The assumption of homoscedasticity states in using the independent variable to
predict the variance in the dependent variable, and that the residuals from the prediction
should be of equal size across all values of the independent variables. When this situation
holds, a scatterplot of the regression standardized residual on the vertical axis against the
regression standardized predicted values on the horizontal axis reveals a clustering of the
scatterplots values evenly without dispersing overly on the 45-degree line. When this
situation is observed, there is homoscedasticity. Conversely, when the scatterplot values
spread away from the 45-degree line, there is heteroscedasticity or unequal scattering
(Francis, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
In the present study, the assumption of homoscedasticity was checked as follows
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Upon the completion of the multiple regression analysis
results (reported in Table 12), scatterplots of the residual (the difference between
obtained and predicted scores of the dependent variable) were diagramed. In this
scatterplot, the regression standardized residual appeared on the vertical axis, and the
regression standardized predicted values on the horizontal axis. A visual examination
suggested that the trend of the plot centered on the 45-degree line in a fairly approximate
manner.
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Overall, heteroscedasticity is always a matter of degree (Field, 2013). Thus, in the
present study, a visual inspection of the scatterplot (Figure 5) suggests that the null
hypothesis of heteroscedasticity is rejected while the alternative hypothesis of
homoscedasticity is accepted (Field, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).

Figure 5. Scatterplot test for heteroscedasticity of the dependent variable (CR).
Heteroscedasticity Solution
Even if there is evidence of heteroscedasticity, heteroscedasticity-consistent
estimators can address problems of heteroscedasticity. Specifically, weighted least
squares (WLS) estimators can be used to run the multiple regression analysis. Finally,
WLS statistical routine is available in SPSS.
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Additionally, even if the degree of heteroscedasticity were to be severe in the
present study, a variance-stabilizing transformation would have been used to address the
problem by transforming the dependent variable (CR).
Linearity
The linearity assumption was checked using scatterplots of the residual of the
dependent variable (CR). In this scatterplot framework, the regression standardized
residual appeared on the vertical axis, and the regression standardized predicted values
appeared on the horizontal axis as reported in Figure 5. As can be seen in Figure 5, most
of the residual values are randomly appearing around the zero line. This is empirical
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of non-linearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
However, if the relationship between the dependent variable (CR) and the independent
variable is found to be non-linear, data transformation could be performed to achieve
linearity (Field, 2013; Francis, 2013).
Durbin–Watson Test of Autocorrelation
The problem of autocorrelation arises mainly with time series data (Francis,
2013). As can be seen in Table 12, the computed Durbin–Watson coefficient was 2.0.
Specifically, this test checks whether there was a serial correlation between errors in the
regression model. Technically, it tested whether adjacent residuals (observed residuals)
were correlated as a way to ascertain whether the unobserved errors have a mutual
relationship. This process is testing the assumption of independent errors.
Importantly, the statistics of the Durbin–Watson test lie in the range of zero to
four (0–4). A value of 2 suggests that the residuals were uncorrelated, a value greater
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than 2 informs adjacent residuals were negatively correlated, and a value below 2
indicates that adjacent residuals were positively correlated. As can be observed in Table
12, the value of adjacent residuals for the present study was 2.010. Therefore, this
empirical evidence suggests that there was no evidence of autocorrelation dictated in the
data set for the present study.
Summary
This study examined three key research questions. The premise of Research
Question 1 was if there was a relationship (influence) of LGS on CR, controlling for
COLL and LEV? Empirical evidence was found in support of this research question. The
argument of Research Question 2 was if there was a relationship (influence) of COLL on
CR. Empirical evidence was found suggesting that there was no influence of loan COLL
on CR. However, when COLL and LEV were jointly examined for their influence on CR,
statistically strong empirical evidence was found suggesting COLL and LEV together
had an influence on CR as shown in Model 1 of Table 12 (p < .05). However, it must be
mentioned that a test of the combined effect of COLL and LEV was not part of the
purpose of the present study. On that note, the conclusion that COLL has no influence on
CR was upheld for this study.
Finally, the investigation of the hypothesized relationship (influence) of leverage
(LEV) on credit rationing (CR) was the focus of Research Question 3. To that end, there
was no empirical evidence found suggesting that LEV had a relationship (influence) on
CR. However, it must be mentioned that a mutual influence of LEV and COLL was
found in this study, but that was never identified as one of the purposes of the study.
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Understandably, the preceding empirical evidence in this chapter informed a
discussion, conclusions, and recommendations for Chapter 5 of this study. That is, the
findings of this study provided the content that informed the presentations in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Since three decades ago, credit rationing has occupied the center stage of
academic debates across the globe, and this trend is not abating (Mason, 2014). The
purpose of this study was to use small business data sets from Florida in 2015 to
quantitatively test the influence of loan guarantee scheme (LGS) on credit rationing (CR),
controlling for the effects of loan collateral (COLL) and loan leverage (LEV). Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) seminal theory of credit rationing was the theoretical framework for the
study. Evidently, their theory of credit rationing has been dubbed “the workhorse StiglitzWeiss model of credit rationing” (Agur, 2012, p. 220). Therefore, the Stiglitz-Weiss
model was the appropriate theoretical framework for this study. Thus, the study
empirically investigated the nature of the theorized linkages between four key variables
in the empirical literature on credit rationing:
(1) Small business credit rationing,
(2) Small business participation in loan guarantee scheme,
(3) Small business loan collateral, and
(4) Small business loan leverage.
To be more specific about the framework of the Stiglitz-Weiss model, the present
study investigated whether the independent variable (LGS) would explain variations in
the dependent variable (CR), controlling for the confounding effects of two control
variables (loan COLL and LEV).
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A literature search revealed a gap in the current literature on small business credit
rationing—specifically on examining whether loan guarantee scheme was a major
contributor in explaining the variance in small business credit rationing, controlling for
the confounding effects of loan collateral and leverage. Thus, this was the major research
gap the study attempted to fill.
Interpretation of Findings
Using the conceptual lens of the Stiglitz-Weiss model, the major purpose of the
present study was pivoted on one key empirical question: Holding the effects of loan
collateral and leverage constant (i.e., controlling for them), would small business
participation in federal government-sponsored loan guarantee scheme explain or predict
small business credit rationing?
Overall, the study found empirical evidence in support of the question. Small
business participation in loan guarantee had a relationship (influence) on credit rationing
when the confounding effects of collateral and leverage were statistically controlled,
which is in line with Research Question 1.
With this background discussion in mind, a discussion of key findings of this
study is now presented.
Key Findings and Interpretation
First, the evidence appears to be strong that small business participation in loan
guarantee scheme had a relationship (influence) on credit rationing. It was notable that
the primary research objective of the present study centered on Hypothesis 1. Thus, with
the finding that loan guarantee scheme was a statistically significant predictor of credit
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rationing, this result appears interesting and encouraging, especially given that this result
was found even after controlling for the potential confounding effects of loan collateral
and loan leverage.
In contrast, even though loan collateral and loan leverage were not of immediate
substantive interest other than being control variables, each variable had no relationship
with loan credit rationing. Evidently, these three propositions aligned with the three
empirical questions examined in this study. With the preceding summary of these three
findings of this study, I now shift focus to a detailed discussion of each of the three key
findings.
The next question about this finding was if it corroborated (or contradicted) past
and current research on small business credit rationing. A literature search failed to find
past or current studies on small business credit rationing focused on investigating the
central research question of the present study—is there any relationship (influence) of
loan guarantee scheme on credit rationing, controlling for collateral and leverage?
Therefore, to the best of my knowledge, the present study is the first study examining this
research question. As the first study to investigate this particular question, this study has
made a major contribution to the literature in credit rationing.
Comparison with Similar Studies
Since many past decades, it has been well established that comparing and
contrasting results from a research study with those from similar studies inform the
cumulative literature for theory building, and more (e.g., Churchill, 1979). Even though
empirical studies have examined several research questions on small business credit
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rationing, there is still a paucity of research focusing on the research questions addressed
in the present study, except for Kirschenmann (2016). Because of Kirschenmann’s
relevance to the present study regarding the research purpose, study design, and method
of data collection, the present study therefore followed Kirschenmann.
For these reasons, the results of Kirschenmann (2016) merit comparison with the
results of the present study. Hence, a brief comparison is presented. Kirschenmann
studied the relative differences in the degree of credit rationing among opaque and
transparent small businesses over time—beginning from the time the small businesses
established relationships with the banks to future periods with the banks in a longitudinal
time context. Overall, this panel data study found empirical evidence suggesting credit
rationing was higher for opaque rather than transparent small businesses at the beginning
of their relationships with banks, but this trend decreased for opaque and transparent
small businesses over time.
Additionally, Kirschenmann’s (2016) study focused on problems related to
information asymmetry and absence of bankers’ incentives to small businesses. Her study
found that these two issues were the core factors responsible for credit rationing and the
changes thereof over time. However, the research objectives of the present study were not
the same as those discussed in Kirschenmann, even though both studies were centered on
small business credit rationing.
However, there are two critical factors common among the present study and
Kirschenmann. Both studies operationalized the dependent variable (CR) in the same
way, and this operationalization makes the comparison of findings more meaningful
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across present studies and potential future ones. Both studies measured credit rationing as
the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts, such that this ratio was an inverse measure
of credit rationing (Kirschenmann, 2016). Using this inverse measure, the smaller the
value, the more severe credit rationing was on the small businesses under focus and vice
versa.
Another commonality between the both studies is that they used loan leverage as
a control variable, among other control variables. However, there appears to be an
important difference. In Kirschenmann, small business loan leverage was inversely
related to the dependent variable (CR), and this result was statistically significant.
Conversely, in the present study, loan leverage was positively related to credit rationing,
but it was statistically insignificant.
Finally, it is well established that control variables in empirical studies have no
substantive interest in and of themselves, except that the variables are confounders that
should be controlled statistically so that their effects on the variance of the dependent
variable are accounted for statistically.
Limitations of the Study
As with any other empirical study, the present study has limitations. In the same
way, these limitations would inform future researchers to make contributions that would
enhance the current knowledge on credit rationing. The present study used archival data
drawn from balance sheet information submitted to lender banks. Although archival data
have obvious advantages, primary data obtained directly from small businesses may offer
superior, fine-grained information.
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Furthermore, the present study investigated the potential role of loan guarantee
scheme as the key independent variable linked to small business credit rationing,
controlling for the confounding effects of loan collateral and leverage. There are other
possible independent variables linked to small business credit rationing not included in
the present study. For example, there are other potential determinants of credit rationing
not examined in the present study because they were not considered relevant to the
present study (Drakos & Giannakopoulos, 2011).
Recommendations
In line with other empirical research, it has been well established that
recommendations are informed by the gaps not addressed in an empirical study (Mason,
2014). With this statement in mind, the results of the present study have suggestions for
policy makers and managers involved with small business credit rationing activities.
The present study found empirical evidence in support of the link between small
business participation in loan guarantee scheme and small business loan credit rationing,
controlling for the confounding influence of loan collateral and leverage. With this
evidence bearing in mind, policy makers and managers may now investigate deeper the
nature of these linkages.
For example, small business loan managers may want to gain further
understanding in how increasing small business participation in loan guarantee schemes
may reduce loan credit rationing, and how other macroeconomic variables may impact
this process. Researchers in the FED can further explore the implications of the results of
the present study to small business loan rationing.
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Implications
The core of Walden University’s mission statement hinges on delivering social
change to the stakeholders of the university. To attain this strategic objective, research
and learning activities at Walden University have been rooted on the goal of continuous
improvement in the pursuit of best practices and delivering these practices to all
university stakeholders. Hence, by this strategic intent, the capstone objective of the
present study centered on ensuring that the findings of this study make a positive
contribution by delivering social change to societal stakeholders.
As small business loan managers and policy makers are informed of the outcome
of this research, the likelihood may be higher that they are empowered to optimally
allocate society’s scarce and limited resources in the production of goods and services for
the benefit of society, for this motivation is the bedrock of the federal government’s
strategy for the small business loan guarantee scheme. This way, the outcome of this
study would contribute to social change by reducing negative economic consequences of
small business loan credit rationing and information asymmetry.
Future Research
The present study has implications related to suggestions for future research. Of
all the problems related to small business credit rationing research, lack of access to the
“right” data is the main limitation. Honestly, the extensive literature review for this study
led to the breakthrough in accessing the micro-level balance sheet data necessary for this
study. I say this to emphasize that future research is entirely dependent on the availability
of the “right” micro and macroeconomic data that research on credit rationing demands.
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Although the FED and the SBA are making attempts at establishing publicly
available databases useful for empirical research on credit rationing, these data sets are
not in categories that would render them appropriate to address the critical research
questions in small business credit rationing research at the firm-level. For example, future
research can replicate the present study conditional on the availability of micro- and firmlevel data. The need for replication is well established, but access to small business credit
rationing data sets to accomplish this need is a herculean task.
Equally important, future research should examine other theoretically justified
determinants of small business credit rationing. For example, future research can
replicate the present study using data from other countries. As well, gender (male versus
female small business ownership) small business credit rationing literature has
consistently shown mixed results. Although sex may be an important covariate, access to
primary data on each cohort (males versus females) still poses a challenge. Thus, there is
a research need to explore whether males and females are credit rationed differentially in
the United States and worldwide.
Conclusions
The conclusion of this study could not have been reached without a proper reexamination of the research questions and the hypotheses:
Research Question 1 asked if there was any relationship (influence) of loan
guarantee scheme on credit rationing. Once the effects of the two control variables
(COLL and LEV) were statistically held constant, the influence of loan guarantee scheme
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on credit rationing became strong [F (3, 236) = 40.29; p < .001)]. Thus, loan guarantee
scheme has a relationship (influence) on credit rationing.
Research Question 2 asked if there was any relationship (influence) of collateral
on credit rationing. Empirical evidence suggested there was no relationship (influence) of
loan collateral on credit rationing.
Research Question 3 asked if there was any relationship (influence) of leverage on
credit rationing. Empirical evidence found no relationship (influence) of loan leverage on
credit rationing. Finally, the public policy implications and social change ramifications of
the study were presented.
Hence, the purpose of this quantitative, archival data, correlational study was to
test the influence of loan guarantee scheme on credit rationing, while simultaneously
controlling the effects of loan collateral and leverage. The study positioned itself on small
businesses that have been credit rationed in Florida in 2015. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
theory of credit rationing was the theoretical platform for the study. According to this
theory, lenders (typically banks) fail to extend the full amount of credit that would reflect
the correct assessment of information available at the time the credit contract is done
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). In other words, credit rationing occurs when banks deny a loan
to borrowers who have the same characteristics as those that receive the loan. In this
sense, a small business loan borrower is said to be credit rationed if the demand for the
loan is greater than the amount of the loan the small business received. Thus, the gap
between the amount of loan requested and loan received by the small business borrower
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is typically operationalized as credit rationing (Drakos & Giannakopoulos, 2011; Mason,
2014; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), which is the criterion variable for the present study.
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